The Divine Command Theory of Ethics (Part 2): Arguments against

To read part 1 of this article click here

The arbitrariness of God's commands

With the Divine Command Theory (DCT), whatever God says goes. Although most believers would probably not see any problem with this (especially if they take the view that God is benevolent), for others it suggests that morality is arbitrary, as God is not bound by some already established (or recognised) moral guidelines or moral authority, and if God is not bound by any moral law/criteria this means that the Ten Commandments (in the Judeo-Christian tradition) could have been, 'You shall kill people you do not like', or 'You shall steal' etc. That the commandment is "Do not kill"  or "Do not steal" is entirely due to God deciding that this is how it will be. As Theodore Schick Jr. notes:

"Since God is free to establish whatever set of moral principles [God] chooses, [God] could just have well have chosen this set as any other." (Schick Jr. T., Morality requires God.. or does it?" [Brackets mine])

For some people, such as the German philosopher G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716), this presents a worrying situation. Although he was a committed Christian, Leibniz argued that to believe God could have chosen to decree an alternative moral code to the one established, and still be considered morally justified in doing this, was to destroy whatever grounds one had for praising and worshipping God:

"Why praise him for what he has done, if he would be equally praiseworthy in doing the contrary? Where will be his justice and his wisdom if he has only a certain despotic power, if arbitrary will takes the place of reasonableness."  (G. W. Leibniz)

The point here is that if God's commands have no moral grounding apart from God’s will, then it is simply a matter of God choosing to say certain things are 'good' or not on the basis that they are right (or moral) to God. Now this requires an enormous amount of trust that the moral code God has decreed for humanity to live by is just and right. It also requires people to trust that this is the best of all possible worlds, in that the moral code God has established here cannot, will not, and should not be surpassed at any time. What this means is that if we think things could be better here, then we are essentially casting doubt on God's goodness.

On the problem of knowing if what God says is good, is Good (Kai Nielsen)

In his book Ethics Without God (1973), Kai Nielsen raises a number of objections to some of the central tenets of the DCT. Firstly, in order accept that God has given us a moral law to live by, we must surely have to assume that this moral law is accessible to us. For the Christian, God's moral law is said to be found in Scripture (the Bible), which as far as Nielsen is concerned requires them to first believe that the Bible is God's Word. However the problem with this is that before we can accept the idea that the Bible contains God's moral law, we have to first accept that it is the Word of God which contains God's moral law, which is clearly circular logic.

As an atheist Nielsen also under no compulsion to believe the Bible is the Word of God, and as such the idea that Scripture contains God's moral law is somewhat irrelevant as far as he is concerned. This also begs the question as to why he should feel obliged to live according to its precepts.

Even if the Bible does contain the commands of God, merely commanding someone to do something does not make it moral to that thing. For in order to accept that God's commands are 'good', we first have to assume that the terms 'God' and 'good' are identical. In other word's, the statement 'God is good' would have to be the equivalent of saying 'good is God'. Yet the problem with this is that in order to begin to understand the nature of moral goodness, we clearly need to know what goodness is, otherwise how do we know that God is actually good?

"We call God good because we have experienced the goodness of his acts, but in order to do this, in order to know that he is good or to have any grounds for believing that he is good, we must have an independent moral criterion which we use in making this predication of God." (Kai Nielsen)

Nielsen's point is that if God changed the moral code, how would we know whether this was a 'good' thing to do or not unless we have some prior knowledge of what constitutes Goodness. He also argues that it is logically impossible for God to create morality, as it is not a thing, but involves decisions about what what 'ought' to be the case. As such, the burden of proof is for the DCT to show why there can be no morality without God:

"Morality without religion, without theism, is quite possible. In fact, just the reverse is the case. Christianity, Judaism and theistic religions of that sort could not exist if people did not have a moral understanding that was, logically speaking, independent of them." (Kai Nielsen)

In closing Nielsen argues that if religion is the source of morality, then why are there so many atrocities committed in the name of God?

On the question of doing something just because God commands it (A. C. Grayling)

Philosopher A. C. Grayling discusses the DCT in his book, What Is Good?: The Search for the Best Way to Live. In chapter 4 (The Ordinances of God), he notes that a fundamental feature of morality in what he calls the 'religions of the book' (these being Judaism, Christianity and Islam), is that God commands something and people obey. Hand-in-hand with this is the notion that sin is disobedience (resulting in punishment), whilst virtue (or moral living) is obedience and will be rewarded (either in this life or the next). In the Bible, this idea is most famously illustrated in Genesis 3:1-24, where humanity is cursed and expelled from the Garden of Eden for eating the forbidden fruit. Commenting on the Genesis account, Grayling says:

"If a deity were passing this judgement now, it would be in violation of the article in most human rights conventions forbidding excessive, cruel and inhumane punishment."

Grayling's chief concern with the DCT is that it hinges around the dual notion of our being required to obey God's Laws because God commands us to do this, and fear of punishment if one does not. For Grayling this offers no justification for actually obeying the commands or God or even considering them to be Good. The only reason it seems we should obey them, is because we fear being punished.

Of course, the standard justification for the goodness of God's commands is (as we have seen), that they are grounded in the goodness (or benevolence) of God. However, the decision to accept that God is good would have to be based on some prior sense of what goodness is. Thus we arrive very firmly back at the Euthyphro Dilemma and the critiques of Kai Nielsen discussed here and in part 1. We also have to trust that God has in mind our long-term welfare and knows exactly what to do to bring this about. However, for Grayling, the evidence of history suggest God may not quite be able to do this:

"The 'Old Testament' is full of examples of a deity changing its mind, repenting of earlier decisions, committing genocide in some cases and mere mass murder in others, in fury as a result of mankind's exercise of the free will it gave them and which they have used in ways it seems not to have foreseen."

In this he appears to be echoing similar concerns about the nature of God as John Roth does (see A Theodicy of Protest: John K Roth).

In the end Grayling believes the basic premise of the DCT cannot be justified, because we should not be forced to accept the commands of God as being those we must obey, even if they are intended (by God) to make our lives better:

"My loving my children is not a reason for my children to live as I wish they would, still less as I order them to."

Thus Grayling concludes that it is an unsound argument to say that just because A loves B, that B must do as A requires. Of course, if A has perfect knowledge of what will be beneficial to B (and has the power to make this happen), then Grayling's argument may be significantly weakened.

The Divine Command Theory of Ethics (Part 1): Introduction and Arguments For

Introduction

“The religions of the book are distinctive, and perhaps unique, in postulating a personal deity who in each case makes a set of moral demands on its worshippers.” (A.C. Grayling, What is Good?)

The simple and basic premise of the divine command theory of ethics (DCT), is that something is good because God says it is. For example, from reading the Bible it seems we should not tell lies because this is one of the Ten Commandments given to Moses by God (Exodus 20:1-17). Following on from this we can say that any God-given moral truth (in any theistic faith) has the following features:

• God's commands must be treated as the Ultimate source of authority for what is considered 'right' and 'wrong', even if we do not agree with them or do not understand why this has to be the case
• The more knowledge we have of how God wants us to live (or the closer we get to God), the better our lives will be
• As God is unchanging, so moral truths will never change

Due to the relationship between God and 'goodness' (or the Good), we often hear some believers lamenting the downfall of society due to people turning away from God:

“When we as a country again acknowledge God as our creator and Jesus Christ as the Savior of mankind, we will be able to turn this nation around economically as well as in every other way.” (Rev, Jerry Falwell)

The DCT also assumes God is good (benevolent), and only wills good things (or issues good commands) for our benefit.

The Euthyphro Dilemma

Although the basic premise of the DCT is rather simple (what God commands is good, therefore do those things to live a good life), things get complicated once we start to consider why God's commands are to be deemed good.

The classic discussion of this philosophical question is attributed to the Ancient Greek philosopher Plato. In The Last Days of Socrates, Socrates is outside a courthouse awaiting prosecution by Meletus for corrupting the youth of Athens with his 'wisdom'. Unsurprisingly he gets into a conversation with someone, this time Euthyphro, who is there to prosecute his father for allowing a 'prisoner' to die. Euthyphro believes he is doing the right thing, or in other words, he considers his actions to be holy (or agreeable to the gods). So Socrates challenges him to state exactly what he thinks holiness (or 'Goodness') is. Euthyphro's initial answer is that, 'what is agreeable to the gods is holy, and what is not agreeable is unholy'. However, Socrates notes that sometimes the gods disagree amongst themselves, so this begs the question as to whether there can be any agreement between them as to what things are truly holy. In response, Euthyphro suggest that all of them would agree that killing a man is wrong (unholy).

Naturally Socrates wants him to prove this claim, and it is here that the Euthyphro dilemma is stated:

“Euthyphro: Well, I should certainly say that what's holy is whatever all the gods approve of, and that its opposite, what all the gods disprove of, is unholy…

Socrates: We'll soon be in better position to judge, my good chap. Consider the following point: is the holy approved by the gods because it's holy, or is it holy because it's approved?”

Socrates’ point is that what is ultimately holy must be something agreeable to all the gods at the same time, for it be the Ultimate standard of Holiness.

To help Euthyphro continue to work through this dilemma, Socrates offers him the suggestion that maybe what is Holy is what is Just? The problem here is that Euthyphro cannot explain the nature of Justice without circling back to his earlier argument; that what is Just is that which is divinely approved.

So we are faced with this circular logic:

• The gods are the source of moral authority (“the holy”)
• The gods approve of x because it is “holy”
• It is “holy” because the gods approve of it (or say it is “holy”)

The significance of the Euthyphro Dilemma for moral philosophy

Although those who believe in a God consider God to be the ground of morality, if there is no external verification for what God says is Good then God's commands appears arbitrary. Of course, for the believer this is no problem as they assume God is benevolent and would only command us to do good things. But what if God were not benevolent? What if God, having up till now condemned lying and murder, decided from now on that lying and murder were Good things to do? If we say God would never do this, because lying and murder are always wrong, this suggests there is a moral standard to which God and God's decrees conform. Thus the question begs; either God is the Ultimate source of Goodness (and we take our chances), or God’s commands conform to some other (Final) standard.

The Euthyphro Dilemma also highlights tensions for non-believers who speak about things being 'good'. Rather than any appealing to God an atheist may say we should appeal to some agreed notion of communal Goodness, but yet again we are faced with problem of justifying a communal sense of Goodness without appealing to some Final notion of 'Goodness'. How do we know that what the community says is good, is in fact Good? In the end we are left struggling to avoid an infinite regress in terms of justifying The Good.

The divine command theory - weak and strong versions

Although the basic premise of the DCT is that whatever God says is 'good' is Good, there are in fact two ways this can be analysed and understood:

• In weaker versions God's commands are said to be applicable only within the context of specific religious communities. For example, Fundamentalist Christians might say homosexuality is wrong, whereas more Liberal Christians may say it is not. Of course, this is not to say that Fundamentalist Christians believe Liberal Christians are correct in their belief (and vice-versa), but that when we analyse the nature of these two different beliefs about homosexuality, we can see that from the Fundamentalist point-of-view it is deemed wrong, but from the Liberal point-of-view it is not. Of course, one major problem with this view of things is that it offers no definitive position on moral issues. There is also no reason why either a Fundamentalist or Liberal Christian should take the view that their belief is wrong, or that they should change their opinion.

• In stronger versions doing 'good' is justified because God wills (or commands) it. This at least gives us a Final standard of Goodness to which we can appeal but as we have already seen there are several problems associated with this view of things. A further problem is that if what is 'good' is deemed to be so simply because God wills it, then this means only those who believe in God have to worry about moral accountability. Grounding morality in God may work for the believer, but has absolutely no relevance for those who do not believe God exists (despite the fact that many believers would say that atheists should obey God's commands). Grounding morality in God also leaves us struggling to the perfection this entails, leading to a lot of guilt and anguish amongst believers.

The Divine Command Theory of Ethics - Philip Quinn's Defence

Philip Quinn argued that The Divine Command Theory should not be rejected simply because God's commands might be said to be arbitrary (i.e. grounded in God' nature alone), but should be accepted because that seems to be the way God works:

• In the Old Testament there are times when God temporarily revoked established moral standards for special purposes. For example, although God had issued the command not to kill (Exodus 20:13), this was clearly revoked when the Israelites were required to enter the Promised Land. For once they were, 'in the cities of the nations the LORD your God is giving you as an inheritance, [they should] not leave alive anything that breathes' (Deuteronomy 20:16 [Bracket mine]).

• In the New Testament Jesus set new moral standards which surpassed those of the Old Testament, showing once again that it is possible to justify morality despite God 'moving the posts' a little ('You have heard that it was said to the people long ago, 'Do not murder, and anyone who murders will be subject to judgment.' But I tell you that anyone who is angry with his brother will be subject to judgment' - Matthew 5:21f).

• The very fact of God's sovereignty means that God is in control of everything, even moral standards. So who are we to argue?

So Quinn's point is that even though God's commands can be accused of being arbitrary (because they are grounded in the nature of God and can and do change), we should still accept them because ultimately God is Good. Of course, Quinn is assuming here that the God we know of (so far) from the Bible is not some evil despot, who might at some point in the future bring into existence a less-than benevolent moral code.

Also, Quinn's arguments only work for some people. For instance, to say that God's commands are 'good' even though God revoked an established moral standards such as “Do not kill” in order that Jews would cleanse the Holy Land, only works to prove to Jews that God is good but not to the numerous people slaughtered in God’s name. An appeal to one God as the source of moral Goodness is therefore questionable to those of different faiths, as well as atheists.

The divine command theory of ethics (Part 2): Arguments against