An Introduction to John Hick's Pluralist Hypothesis (Part 2)

To read part 1 of this article click here

Re-interpreting religion (and religions)

With the publication of An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (1989), Hick introduced the most developed version of his religious pluralism (and the one he is most known for). Whereas in his earlier work he had tended to see religions as culturally determined landing-pads for God, now he presents religions as particular responses to a transcendent Reality. In other words, he has shifted the emphasis from subject (God) to perceiver (humanity). The seeds for this were sown in his early work (as noted above). However, Hick's also acknowledges his indebtedness to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), both of whom examined knowledge as something conditioned by our own (limited) way of perceiving things (as).

In An Interpretation of Religion, Hick (following Kant) argues that there is the world in itself (noumenal), and the world as we understand and perceive it (phenomenal). Support for this view of things can be seen in the fact that people often see and perceive the same things differently. So we all cannot be seeing the world as it really is (otherwise, there would be no disagreement). Each person's experience of the way the world is is, therefore, an interpretation of experience specific to that individual's point-of-view.

Applying this insight to the matter of religious experience, Hick concludes that all religious experience is simply an expression of a particular experience of a transcendent reality by the devotee (what he also calls 'experiencing-as'). Thus we can see how someone born in India is not only going to naturally be a Hindu but also, consider the Hindu-worldview normative (or normal) and all others wrong. For they simply have no way of seeing things any differently!

The Real

In An Interpretation of Religion, Hick radically revised his earlier concept of God, replacing this notion with the idea of an ineffable Real. In theistic traditions (E.g. Judaism, Islam, and Christianity) God is encountered as a personal deity, but what of the non-personal encounters such as Brahman in the Hindu tradition? How can a personal God also be experienced as non-personal at the same time? The concept of an ineffable Real alleviates this dilemma. Turning once again to Kant, Hick distinguishes between the Real as it is in itself ('Real an sich') and the Real as it is variously experienced and thought of by the different faith traditions:

“I want to explore the pluralistic hypothesis that the great world faiths embody different perceptions and conceptions of, and correspondingly different responses to, the Real from within the major variant ways of being human; and that within each of them the transformation of human existence from self-centredness to Reality-centredness is taking place.” (John Hick)

The idea that we experience the Real in different ways, and that this is the reason why there are different faith traditions in the world, releases an inherent tension in pluralist theologies. Religious diversity does not try to avoid contradictions. Diversity and difference are the natural results of the varieties of human experience of the Real. People are different. We have been born in different places, into different families, and have been raised in different ways to each other. We should not be surprised that just as we have developed different sorts of music and art, so we are naturally going to develop different expressions of faith, belief and practice.

Now the fact that people are 'experiencing the Real' in different ways also begins to challenge the idea that only one faith-tradition is true (exclusivism). Also, in saying that the Real is ineffable and unable to be experienced, or understood, or expressed by human understanding/language, means Hick can also argue for the various faith-traditions as contexts for moral and spiritual betterment. Overall, the 'truthfulness' of a faith-tradition is not so much to do with whether its beliefs are true, but what sort of believer they are producing.

Re-interpreting salvation

In An Interpretation of Religion (and subsequent writings), Hick grounds his pluralist hypothesis in the idea of salvation as that which is a transformative thing:

“I suggest that these different conceptions of salvation are specifications of what, in a generic formula, is the transformation of human existence from self-centredness to a new orientation centred in the divine reality.” (John Hick)

For example, the Golden Rule can be found in all religions, which in the Christian tradition is expressed as “Treat others as you want them to treat you” (Matthew 7:12). Hick believes the extent to which faith-traditions promote this attitude in its adherents, is the extent to which we can consider it to be a valid (and true) expression of faith. Now this might immediately imply a sense of moral exclusivity, for if one faith tradition is producing more ‘saints’ (or good people) than others then surely we should be seeking to win people over to that faith in order to make the world a better place. However, when we compare each of the great world faiths to each other they all seem to be equally as effective in promoting this attitude in their devotees:

“We have no good reason to believe that any one of the great religious traditions has shown itself to be more productive of love/compassion than another.” (John Hick)

Although members of a faith may want to suggest that they are morally superior to others (and as such they would be suggesting that they are members of the 'true faith'), any claim to moral superiority cannot be validated by religious history. In each of the great world faiths, there have been both good and evil actions performed by its devotees. As Hick himself notes: “I suggest today that the onus of proof or of argument is upon any who claim that their own tradition produces morally and spiritually better human beings than all the others.”

Summary

Initially Hick presented his pluralistic hypothesis as something which held in tension the idea of a God of love and was based on a universal plan of salvation. However, over the course of his research, this shifted to focus more on the idea that each of the religions of the world is a unique and culturally conditioned human response to what he calls the Real. Furthermore, because Hick argues for the Real’s ineffability, the various religions of the world are not there to pass on 'truths' concerning it but to simply act as contexts in which human salvation (the shift from egocentrism to non-egocentrism) can take place. Although each religious tradition would distinguish itself from the others by seeing itself as superior to them (exclusivism), this claim cannot be validated when we observe that religious history reveals no distinguishable difference between each of them, so as to suppose the moral superiority or salvific effectiveness of one of them above the others.

An Introduction to John Hick's Pluralist Hypothesis (Part 1)

John Hick (d.2012) was an English philosopher of religion, who in his early years embraced a more evangelical (and fundamentalist) form of Christian belief; one that was firmly committed to the idea that Christianity was the true faith, and the Bible was God's sole revealed Word. However, due to numerous positive encounters with members of other faith traditions, he began to find great difficulty holding onto the belief that one religion was true, and that friends of his who were not-Christians would be going to hell for not subscribing to a belief in Jesus Christ. Furthermore, on the basis of his extensive reading of the scriptures of other faith traditions, he began to conclude that there was just as much 'good' in them as there was in the Bible.

Reviewing his subsequent shift in thinking in God Has Many Names (1980) he writes: “I have from almost as early as I can remember had a rather strong sense of the reality of God as the personal and loving lord of the universe”. The idea of God being both 'personal' and 'loving' were major influences in his development of a more open understanding of the relationship between faith traditions.

Problems with religious exclusivity

In his book God and the Universe of Faiths (1974), Hick began to lay the foundations of what would become his pluralist hypothesis. His initial interest was to explore what he felt was an inherent tension between the idea of a God of love and the Evangelical Christian attitude towards non-Christians. Within Evangelicalism, the possibility of salvation has traditionally been centred on the belief that the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ alone (the incarnate Son of God) has secured salvation for humanity, and that only a personal commitment and belief in this 'fact' would guarantee salvation. This has led to Christian exclusivism, expressed as 'outside Christianity there is no salvation' (aka 'outside the Church there can be no salvation').

However, Hick became concerned that if the Christian God is a God of love, and Christian salvation is the only true salvation, “Can we then accept the conclusion that the God of love who seeks to save all mankind has nevertheless ordained that men must be saved in such a way that only a small minority can, in fact, receive this salvation?”

Taking such a limited approach to the means by which people can be saved (i.e. literally by hearing about Jesus or becoming members of the Christian Church), means that for Hick most of the world would have to be considered damned: 

“It is the weight of this moral contradiction that has driven Christian thinkers in modern times to explore other ways of understanding the human religious situation.” (John Hick)

Accidents of birth 

As far as Hick is concerned a person's religious beliefs are largely determined by where they are born, and as such people cannot be held accountable for 'accidentally' not being born into a Christian environment. Thus, it makes no sense to say that a person born in India into a Hindu family, subsequently leading a good life based on Hindu beliefs, should be condemned by God simply because they were not born in a Christian country, or a Christian family, or because a Christian missionary had failed to reach them in time to tell them about Jesus before they died. In fact, it is obviously going to be the case that a person born in India will most likely grow up with the belief that salvation is achieved through (and by) the many Hindu gods, just as much someone born in Saudi Arabia is most likely going to become a Muslim and follow the teachings of Islam, and therefore will see no reason to convert to another faith tradition.

All this means Hick believes one's view of salvation (and the subsequent means of attaining it), is dependent on (and influenced by) where one has been born, and with this insight he felt he had dealt Christian exclusivism a mortal blow:

“Can we be so entirely confident that to have been born in our particular part of the world carries with it the privilege of knowing the full religious truth?” (John Hick)

Orthopraxis, not orthodoxy

From very early on in his work Hick rejected the Evangelical belief that one needed to hear and respond to a specific message in order to be 'saved'. He also sought to move away from notions of orthodoxy (correct belief) to orthopraxis (correct living); the latter being required if we want to begin to say, “All salvation… is the work of God”. As such, Hick began to interpret the world's religions as culturally-conditioned contexts within which people could grow as moral and spiritual beings, and thus challenged the idea that mission should be about attempting to convert rather than learning from people. Instead, Hick believes contact between members of other religions should only and always be positive and fruitful (“Not to displace but to deepen and enlarge their relationship with God”).

With these early insights, Hick laid the foundation for a revolution to take place in his theology of religion:

“Our next question is this: do we regard the Christian way as the only way, so that salvation is not to be found outside it; or do we regard the other great religions of mankind as other ways of life and salvation?”

An Introduction to John Hick's Pluralist Hypothesis (Part 2)

Notes

*Official website: www.johnhick.org.uk/jsite/

An Irenaean Theodicy (John Hick): Part 2

Click here to read Part 1 of this article

The importance and place of free will in matters of faith

The central principle of the Irenaean Theodicy is that we have been placed in a hostile environment in order to learn to become better people. However, this begs the question as to why God has placed humans in a 'hostile environment' in order to bring them to perfection? For if perfection is your goal, why not simply start (and end) by creating each person perfect as God intends them to be (and at the same time automatically conscious and aware of God)? Hick writes:

"In order to be a person, exercising some measure of genuine freedom, the creature must be brought into existence, not in the immediate divine presence, but at a distance from God."

Although God could have created us perfect, we might not have chosen to be a perfect being as God intended. God is not interested in creating robots. Rather God is more interested in our choosing to become who God wants us to be (at some point in the future), rather than force us to be this way from the start (no matter how long this process takes). Furthermore, in order that we might 'act naturally' and not be overwhelmed by the reality of God, God remains distant to us (what Hick calls an EPISTEMIC DISTANCE).

Epistemology is to do with knowledge. When Hick talks about an 'epistemic distance' he means that God is not 'in our face', so to speak, and knowledge of God's existence is ambiguous. To illustrate what Hick means, think about how people act when their favorite actor or singer is near them, and how differently they act when not. Now imagine how this translates to God. If God’s presence was immediately known to us, we would simply live in fear and awe. There would also be no atheists. As far as Hick is concerned God does not want this. God wants us to live free lives. We might argue that God may even want some people to choose to be atheist, which is why God needs draws away from us in order that we might act spiritually and morally as we see fit.

Of course, one consequence of this is that the world is religiously ambiguous, which means we do not have any certain evidence that there is (or is not) a God, but this is the world God desires for us to be in. We live in a world where we have the freedom to live in any way we choose. In terms of belief in God, when someone comes to 'freely to know and love their Maker', they have chosen this for themselves, and that choosing is also far more valuable and meaningful. Something we have struggled for and worked out for ourselves is more valuable (and valued) than something we are simply given:

"A moral goodness that exists as the agents initial given nature, without ever having been chosen by him in the face of temptations to the contrary, is intrinsically less valuable than a moral goodness which has been built up through the agent's own responsible choices through time in the face of alternative possibilities." (John Hick)

Making real choices that count

For Hick, the goal (of 'struggling humanity') is the turning from self-centredness to Reality (or God) centredness. Pain and suffering in the world is therefore the residue of people acting selfishly, or in other words the actions of morally and spiritually immature people. Although this explains why moral evil exists, the question begs as to why God wants our 'learning to become better people' to take place in a natural realm that is dangerous, and where the fragility of the human body can quickly and easily lead to illness, pain and suffering?

Hick's response is that moral and spiritual development cannot take place in a static environment, but in one where there are real consequences for both ourselves and others around us. For example, we cannot expect to learn about the fragility of the human body if banging a hammer down onto one's thumb

never hurt, or led to any physical injury. By living in world where our choices make a real difference we learn to live thoughtfully, and with careful consideration. If the situation was such that no-one would ever experience physical pain/suffering as a result of our actions, then how could

anyone develop any sense of moral responsibility?

And beyond…

Finally, Hick is the first to admit that the person-making process of moving from self-centredness to Reality-centredness is only being completed in a few people here on earth. There are very few

people we might regard as a 'true saint' when we look back over the course of human history. Thus the

Irenaean theodicy presupposes that there must be a continuation of life after death whereby this process can be completed:

"Only if [salvation] includes the entire human race can it justify the sins and sufferings of the entire human race throughout all history." (John Hick [bracket mine])

It is for this reason that Hick's Irenaean Theodicy is sometimes called a 'soul-making' theodicy.

Some issues

As attractive as Hick’s thesis is, it is not without problems. For one, if people are meant to live in a world where our choices have significant consequences for our personal benefit, then Hick might stand accused of belittling some of the excesses of human depravity. For instance, for a few people to learn not to be anti-Semitic, millions of Jews lost their lives in World War II. One could also say that the Jews who died in the Holocaust we also being used for the moral benefit of others, which does not

count very favorably towards what some might say God thinks of them. To use others as a means to our personal end is also something we might consider the opposite of trying to live free of self-centredness.

Hick's response to this is that our judgement of what constitutes 'the excesses of human depravity' is relative to our personal situation. In other word's, what we consider to be excessive today may not be considered so by others say in fifty or a hundred years time:

"In a world in which there was no cancer, something else would then rank as the worst form of natural evil." (John Hick)

So although the world may appear harsh and hostile (and especially towards certain groups of people), there is always something worse coming along. Even the fact that calamity strikes indiscriminately, in that the 'good' are often afflicted with pain and suffering whilst the 'bad' seem to enjoy a long healthy and happy life, is all a matter of keeping things in perspective:

"Let us suppose that... the sinner was [always] punished and the virtuous [always] rewarded. Would such dispensation serve a person-making purpose?... God has set us in a world containing unpredictable contingencies and dangers, in which unexpected and undeserved calamities may occur to anyone; because only in such a world can mutual caring and love be elicited." (John Hick)

The unsavory aspect of Hick’s theodicy is evident here. Part of 'growing up' is the realisation that we cannot always have things 'our way'. We live in a world where sometimes the cards will be stacked against us (and sometimes not), and we have to deal with that. If 'life' always patted us on the back for doing good, we might never learn to be better people when faced with times when we have done an unrecognised (or unacknowledged) 'good'. For it is in situations such as this that we learn to truly become people of deeper moral and spiritual character, rather than superficially so. However I cannot help but think that this ‘suck it up’ mentality is only going to be acceptable to a male, Christian, white, educated, and affluent member of the human race, such as John Hick!

An Irenaean Theodicy (John Hick): Part 1

"Can a world in which sadistic cruelty often has its way, in which selfish lovelessness is so rife, in which there are debilitating diseases, crippling accidents, bodily and metal decay, insanity, and all manner of natural disasters be regarded as the expression of infinite creative goodness? Certainly all this could never by itself lead anyone to believe in the existence of a limitlessly powerful God. And yet even in a world which contains these things innumerable men and women have believed and do believe in the reality of an infinite creative goodness, which they call God." (John Hick)

Introduction

John Hick has made major contributions in two areas of Christian theology. The first is the relationship between the different world faiths, whereby he attempts to explain the phenomena of religion from a religious (as opposed to a naturalist) perspective. The other is his Irenaean Theodicy, and how theists can reconcile a belief in the infinite goodness of God in light of the presence of evil and suffering in the world.

Although Hick addresses the problem of evil and suffering from a largely Christian perspective, he is aware that this is not a specifically 'Christian problem'. In fact, he acknowledges from the start that each world faith has a need to justify what they believe about the nature of the Divine and/or the world, with the existence of evil and suffering.

Setting the scene

Hick begins by insisting that any theodicy should fulfill two criteria:

• It should internally coherent and consistent with the religious tradition on which it is grounded (E.g. a theodicy grounded in the Christian tradition should be acceptable to Christians, and recognisable as a 'Christian theodicy').
• It should internally coherent and consistent with the picture of what we know of the natural realm (i.e. it should be scientifically credible).

This latter point means Hick requires a theodicy to be faithful to the scientific enterprise, and be consistent with the 'facts' we know of the world (E.g. Acting as if there is no gravity is 'bad', acting as if there is 'good'). The modern scientific enterprise also presupposes an evolutionary approach to understanding how we have developed physically, emotionally, cognitively etc. So in order to remain consistent with this, we must understand our moral and spiritual development in the same way. As such Hick refuses to accept that biological life-forms developed physically, emotionally, cognitively etc. over a long period of time, but that they suddenly gained moral and spiritual maturity (as as literal reading of the Creation accounts in the Bible seems to imply). On the contrary, the same biological evolutionary developmental processes must be said to apply all aspects of our lives (moral and spiritual included).

Hick also believes that in order to remain true to the modern scientific view of the world we must begin with the notion that evil really exists, and is the cause of real pain and suffering in humans. Hick is aware that traditionally Christians have tended to adopt the FREEWILL DEFENSE (FWD) to explain the presence of evil and suffering in the world (and his rejection of this is the main reason why he adopts the Irenaean model), which suggests that all evil and suffering is the result of a misuse of human freedom. In doing so, the FWD places the blame for evil and suffering firmly onto us.

However, this raises the question as to why God created a world where evil and suffering can occur

in it (something Hick believes the Irenaean Theodicy is better suited to explain)? Of course, the classic FWD response to this is that this is the world God made, and that is that! However, some go further and claim that God actually allows evil and suffering to occur, for some greater good:

"And we know that in all things God works for the good of those who love him." (Romans 8:28)

The problem with this interpretation of things (for Hick), is that it means evil and suffering does not really occur in the world - it just appears that way to those who do not see God working 'behind the scenes'! Yet this is contrary to the modern scientific mind, which takes that view that evil and suffering

really does occur (i.e. You really are going to die if you jump off a 50 story building with no parachute or safety net to prevent you crashing into the ground). As such, Hick believes any credible theodicy must reject the 'evil re-interpretation model', and be grounded on the 'evil really occurs' premise.

More reasons why Hick rejects the FWD

As a further prelude to his Irenaean theodicy, Hick sets out two further reasons why he rejects the FWD (the traditional Christian model for explaining why evil and suffering occur in the world):

• The idea that humanity was created morally and spiritually perfect yet have 'fallen away' from this state, is not a view backed up by the scientific enterprise which teaches the exact opposite (that humanity has evolved and developed into more complex moral and spiritual beings, from more primitive states).
• There is no evidence to suggest that death, disease, decay, earthquakes, floods etc. are the direct result of human disobedience. It is simply incredible to suggest that the reason why there is death in the world, is because the first humans on the planet ate some forbidden fruit ('And the LORD God said, "The man has now become like one of us, knowing good and evil. He must not be allowed to reach out his hand and take also from the tree of life and eat, and live forever."' - Genesis 3:22).

This means that for Hick, the Genesis account of the creation of the world and the fall of humanity must but understood as a myth (story with a meaning), rather than be read as literal account of what happened.

So although it remains a popular choice for Christian theodicies, Hick believes the FWD is no longer a viable theodicy for people to believe in. The simple reason being that the FWD is contrary to everything we believe to know about ourselves, and the world we live in.

Building a credible theodicy

Hick's Irenaean theodicy takes as its starting point the notion that far from being created perfect (a state from which we are said to have fallen from), that God initiated a 'two-stage' process in the act of creating humanity. Firstly, following the modern scientific-model humans are said to have evolved into social, moral and spiritual beings, who are also capable of reflection on their environment.

However, people becoming like this did not occur suddenly, but developed through a long process of struggle against a hostile environment.

This process of struggle sets the scene for what Hick sees as the second stage in human development; this being that humans - through their own free will - are being made into the Divine 'likeness'. In other words, each human is on a journey to becoming more God-life (i.e. 'Children of God'). Thus perfection, rather than lying in the past (as the FWD suggests), now lies in the future!

An Irenaean Theodicy (John Hick): Part 2

The Freewill Defense (St. Augustine of Hippo): Part 2

Click here to read part 1 of this article

Natural Evil and the Principle of Plenitude

Freewill can explain the presence of moral evil in the world (this being brought about by human mis-choices), but what about the seemingly vast amount of natural evil* present in the world (e.g. earthquakes, tornadoes, disease etc.)? 

Following a literal reading of Genesis 3, natural evil can be considered something which occurred due to the sin of Adam:

"To Adam he said, 'Because you listened to your wife and ate from the tree about which I commanded you, 'You must not eat of it,' 'Cursed is the ground because of you; through painful toil you will eat of it all the days of your life. It will produce thorns and thistles for you, and you will eat the plants of the field.' " (Genesis 3:17f)

However, for Augustine the presence of natural evil in the world was explained by something called the PRINCIPLE OF PLENITUDE.

The principle of plenitude begins by showing how the universe exhibits great diversity. For instance, we look around us and see tremendous differences in the quality and character of all things. Yet the question begs (for Augustine) as to why there is such diversity, and why there seems to be so much inequality and unfairness? For instance, some creatures live short and harsh lives while others live long and pleasant lives. Furthermore, why were humans created with the capacity to sin (and thus break their relationship with God and bring about moral corruption)? Why weren’t they created perfect instead? As the theologian John Hick suggests, 'why... is there a world rather than only the highest of heavens'? Why didn’t God simply create a heaven on earth?

Taking his lead from Plato's Timaeus, Augustine argues that all creatures were brought into existence so that 'the whole range of Eternal Ideas should become incarnated in the world of sense' (Hick). In other words, the heavens and the earth are perfect because they contain such a diverse ranges of things in them, and without this the fullness of God's creativity would not be expressed.

Is this as good as it gets?

Logically what follows from this is that from the human point-of-view, a diverse world/universe is there simply for our enjoyment and benefit (anthropocentrism). Of course, many modern day ecologists are generally unhappy to place humans at the top of the creative 'tree', especially at the expense of recognising the intrinsic value in both the environment and non-humans species. Most people are also unwilling to see the world as simply the 'servant' (and server) of humanity. So the idea that there are many diverse species (and things) in the world to make the world more interesting for those who can appreciate it, does not seem to fit into the modern view of things.

A further problem is that if a diverse world is an expression of Divine creativity in all its fullness, only limited by what God could logically do or has conceived of doing, then if this world is 'perfect', then 'we have no recourse left but to despair' (Leibniz), for we can imagine a significantly better world than this. For instance, we can imagine a world where there is no evil and suffering (or even significantly less than what there is). Of course, if we can imagine a better world than this one then either this world is not perfect or God has limited ability (or vision) in what counts as perfection compared to us.

The Sovereignty of God

In response to charges such as these, Augustine would argue that although the world looks imperfect to us, this is because we are seeing things from a limited (or distorted) perspective. From the standpoint of God, all things are good. Even the apparent evil in the world contributes to making everything perfect. In other words, all degrees of good and evil have a place in the Divine Will and order of things. This means evil and suffering are not 'wasteful' by-products of the world and the universe, but things God uses to bring about a greater good.

So any concern we have with evil and suffering is merely relative to our own viewpoint ('the universe with its sinister aspect is perfect' (Hick p.84)). If we could only see things as God does, we would be less concerned about the child dealing with cancer, or the baby born with AIDS. If evil and suffering were out of God's control, then God's sovereignty would be questioned. Events would have transpired such than an all-powerful Deity, were not in control of things.

For Augustine, the idea that God is not in control of everything is anathema. His theodicy is designed to protect not only God's sovereignty, but also God's perfect goodness. If the world were out of control, then God could not really be said to be all-good (benevolent). Also, as far as the natural order is concerned, death and destruction are a necessary part of things. Without them, there would be no way new life could emerge.

"Some perish to make way for others that are born in their room, and the less succumb to the greater, and the things that are overcome are transformed into the quality of those that have the mastery, this is the appointed order of things transitory. Of this order the beauty does not strike us because by our mortal frailty we are so involved in a part of it, that we cannot perceive the whole, in which these fragments that offend us are harmonised with the most accurate fitness and beauty." (Augustine)

A perfect world?

So with all this in mind we might be tempted to think that the world and the universe are perfect? For if all things find their place in God's grand scheme of things (including evil and suffering), then surely we no longer need to be concerned about the so-called ‘problem’ of evil, for evil is simply another facet of goodness? Augustine's response to this would be to say no; real evil really does exist! There are things in this world, and things people do, which God definitely desires not to happen. However, evil does not (and cannot be allowed to) upset the moral order of things. Moral evil, for instance, does not upset the moral order of creation, for sin will always be punished by God. However we should heed Hick’s warning here, that:

"A universe in which sin exists but is precisely cancelled out by retribution is no less good than a universe in which there is neither sin nor punishment." (John Hick)

This still leaves the question-begging, that if 'evil' is ultimately something 'good' then why does God punish sinners?

Although sin is a blemish on God's creation, God allows sin (and sinners) to remain in the world for the time being. Of course, this raises the question that if God has preordained sin to be a part of the world (and human experience), then surely God is responsible for the presence of sin and moral evil in the world? Taken a stage further we might also venture to suggest that God’s Sovereignty leads Augustine to surmise that based on the the evidence God has chosen (or predestined) only some of humanity to be saved (i.e. become Christians), with the vast majority of humankind dammed? So although Augustine denies that sin has an independent existence apart from God and is merely the privation of the good, it seems that if not people will enter heaven then evil does have an independent existence apart from God after all.

Some further issues

Augustine's theodicy has been largely adopted by the Western Church and has become the go-to theodicy with regard to addressing the problem of evil and suffering. The key idea is that God is in control of everything, but not the free choices of free agents (such as humans and angels). However, what does it mean to say we are created with free will? For instance, in critiquing Augustine, John Hick argues whether the angels are truly capable of sinning ('If the angels are finitely perfect, then even though they are in some sense free to sin they never will, in fact, do so' (Hick))? If a perfect being sins then surely, as Hick argues, they were not perfect in the first place, and God is to be held accountable as their Maker?

Of course, Augustine held that God created the angels (and humanity) in the full knowledge that some would fall (sin), even though it was never God's desire for them to do so. So although God is our Creator, and although God knew that some of God's created beings would sin, God is once again absolved from blame (as far as Augustine is concerned), because God did not force any of them to make these (free) choices.

But once again we return to the matter of whether God is responsible for the presence of evil and suffering in the world. For if God created beings God knew would sin, yet chose some of them to remain good without transgressing their free will (such as the angels), then why not keep all of them from sinning? And if God is able to save some of humanity (without transgressing their free will), why not save all of humanity?

Finally, we are led to ask if God is able to prevent evil and suffering from occurring in the world or not? Augustine tends towards a rather impotent view of God, one who sits back and takes credit for all things that happen in the world as these are an expression of the Divine Will, but one who also appears morally dubious when we consider the horrendous acts of evil and suffering that have taken place.

"While there is still time, I hasten to protect myself, and so I renounce the higher harmony altogether. It's not worth the tears of that one tortured child who beat itself on the breast with its little fist and prayed in its stinking outhouse, with its unexpiated tears to 'dear, kind God'! It's not worth it, because those tears are unatoned for. They must be atoned for, or there can be no harmony... I don't want harmony. From love for humanity I don't want it. I would rather be left with the unavenged suffering. I would rather remain with my unavenged suffering and unsatisfied indignation, even if I were wrong. Besides, too high a price is asked for harmony; it's beyond our means to pay so much to enter on it. And so I hasten to give back my entrance ticket, and if I am an honest man I am bound to give it back as soon as possible. And that I am doing. It's not God that I don't accept, Alyosha, only I most respectfully return him the ticket." (Fyodor Dostoyevsky)

Notes

* Natural evil is associated with things such as earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis and other similar types of events, which are although not directly caused by humans, may cause them harm and suffering. Natural evil is contrasted with moral evil, which are things humans deliberately do to cause suffering (E.g. murder, rape etc.).