Some thoughts about religion, religions and the religious

Introduction

Wherever we have found evidence of human activity on earth, we have found religion. For instance, even in the dimmest moments of recorded history, there is evidence of people burying their dead, which many assume indicates a belief in what happens to a person once they died [1].

The oldest world religion still practiced by large numbers of people today is Hinduism. This began around 5,000 years ago in India. Sikhism is the youngest major world religion, having also begun in India less than 500 years old. 

Although all religions are centered on the belief that each of them contains the truth about life, many of them are also directly related to each other. For example, although Jesus is said to be the founder of Christianity he was also a Jew and a follower of Judaism. For example, Jesus never attended church, but visited the temple in Jerusalem or taught at a synagogue. Siddhartha Gautama, who became known as the Buddha (also the founder of Buddhism), and Guru Nanak (the founder of Sikhism) were both born and raised Hindus. Finally, in the Qur'an (Islamic Scriptures), Islam is said to be a direct descendent of both Judaism and Christianity as these three faiths can be traced back to Abraham (the father of Isaac (Jews) and Ishmael (Arabs)). The Qur’an also talks of Jesus as a great prophet and a respected teacher of Islam. 

Some of the similarities and differences between religions can also be explained by geographical location. For example, religions which have their origins in the Middle Eastern countries (such as Israel, Saudi Arabia), tend to view God as a personal deity and each person as distinct from God and each other. On the other hand, religions which originated in the Indian continent have tended to arrange their beliefs around the idea that each person has a divine soul is directly related to God (or a part of God) [2].

What religion is (or types of religion) 

For all the conflict religion has created in the world, it is also something which draws people together and gives many people a sense of purpose and meaning in their life. One problem Sociologists face with regard to the study of religion is defining exactly what a religion is. In other words, what makes a 'religion', a religion?

Consider the following example. Theistic faith traditions such as Judaism, Christianity, Islam and even Sikhism, are grounded in the notion that there is one God. So we might say that a 'religion' is that which has as its central belief, the idea that there is one God (monotheism). The problem with this definition is that Hinduism is also considered to be a religion, but it promotes the belief that there are many gods (polytheism). The common factor here is the suggestion that a religion promotes belief in a Deity of sorts. However, many consider Buddhism to also be a religion but this does not promote any belief in God. So we see here how we need to broaden our definition of “religion” to accommodate the variety of beliefs in, or non-beliefs in, God/Deity.

Despite the problems associated with defining what religion is, common features of 'religions' are said to be: 

• Belief that there is something greater than humanity
• A distinction between the sacred (pure/good) and the profane (impure/evil)
• Rituals
• A moral code
• Feelings of awe, guilt, or mystery
• A relationship and response to that which is believed to be higher than humanity
• A social group/community based on these shared beliefs

Why people are religious 

Many people who are religious are born into a family where religion plays an important part in the life of their parents or other family members. In this case people are often religious because they have been taught that this is the right way to think about the world.

Others are religious because at some stage they have begun to consider what the Buddha called Ultimate Questions (E.g. ‘Where did the world come from?’, ‘Why am I here?’ and ‘Where am I going?’), and find satisfactory answers to these in a particular faith tradition (or religion). For these people, religion gives them a sense of purpose to life, a and answers questions the non-religious life does not. Of course, if a person believes their religion gives them satisfactory answers to these “ultimate questions”, then they will naturally believe it to be true. Problems arise when people of different faiths claim their beliefs (or religion) is true to the exclusion of others [3].

Of course, the religious point-of-view is only one amongst many other ways of understanding the world and the same event can be interpreted both as an act-of-God, or as a coincidence, or a natural outcome of events. For instance, is someone being healed an answer to prayers, or the result of medicine doing its job ob (or maybe both)? Before science became a significant force in the world for explaining the way things are, people had a more superstitious view of the world. Heaven was believed to literally exist above the clouds, with earth in the middle and hell beneath the crust of the earth. Spirits (angels and demons) were also believed to live in the world, and people relied on the gods for food (i.e. sun and rain). Also, because people believed life in all its fullness was dependent on the gods, people were concerned to keep them happy through sacrifices or living a certain way. Thus as our knowledge of the world and universe grows, so it seems our need for gods (or God) to help us make sense of them becomes less and less necessary.

Yet we need to keep in mind that often 'science' and 'religion' are asking and answering two very different sets of questions about the nature of the world we live in. Science tends to ask and answers how? questions whilst religions tend to ask and answer why? questions. So science might tell us how the world was made, but religion might tell us why it was. Clashes between these two worldviews tend to occur when they try to do what they other does (E.g. If the world is here simply as a natural occurrence, that our purpose in life is solely for genetic reproduction).

The Alistair Hardy Research Centre has recorded over 6,000 personal testimonies of religious experience. In answer to the question, 'How religious are British people in the latter half of the twentieth century?', the centre found that nearly half the adult population of Britain would respond positively to the question by claiming they have had a religious experience or 'other-worldly' (transcendental) experience of some kind. Out of these, some do not want to call this an experience of God, whilst others do. Half of the positive respondents had never attended a place of worship, and many had never told anyone about their experience. One interesting find was that people reporting these experiences are better educated, happier and better balanced mentally than those who did not report them. This, therefore, challenges the generally accepted notion that people claiming to have had a religious experience are odd and mentally unbalanced.

Many may hold this view of the religious mindset because modern science has generally discarded and tabooed the spiritual dimension of human experience. However, if a spiritual experience is not due to error or sickness, and has a positive function for individuals and society, then these taboos will ultimately be challenged.

Some of the positive aspects of religion: 

• Gives people self-esteem and a sense of purpose
• Helps people through difficult times
• Inspires creative activity (E.g. Churches, sculptures, paintings, music)
• Unites people into a community
• Inspires positive political action (E.g. William Wilberforce and the abolition of the slave trade) 

Some of the negative aspects of religion:

• People think that their religion is the only one that is right, which can (and does) breed intolerance amongst people
• Most wars are fought in the name of religion
• Being in a religion can create an unhelpful distinction between those who believe, and those who do not
• Believing that one’s religion holds all the answers can limit the scientific enterprise (NB. Copernicus and the Catholic Church) 

Notes 

[1] In some religions the dead are not buried. For instance, Zoroastrians have traditionally left the bodies of their dead to be consumed by vultures in special places called Towers of Silence. This is because they believe burying or cremating dead bodies will defile the earth (and the elements).

[2] As you are reading this article you will notice that God is never referred to as a 'He' or a 'She'. Rather, the view is taken by the author of this website that God is neither he or she. As such, the terms 'God' and 'Godself' are preferred so as to avoid using any gender-biased language.

[3] It might be tempting to conclude that fighting between people of different faiths is proof that religion is a bad thing, or even that these particular religions are not true. However, the problem might not be with these religions per se, but with the way people understand and practice their faith.

An Introduction to John Hick's Pluralist Hypothesis (Part 2)

To read part 1 of this article click here

Re-interpreting religion (and religions)

With the publication of An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent (1989), Hick introduced the most developed version of his religious pluralism (and the one he is most known for). Whereas in his earlier work he had tended to see religions as culturally determined landing-pads for God, now he presents religions as particular responses to a transcendent Reality. In other words, he has shifted the emphasis from subject (God) to perceiver (humanity). The seeds for this were sown in his early work (as noted above). However, Hick's also acknowledges his indebtedness to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), both of whom examined knowledge as something conditioned by our own (limited) way of perceiving things (as).

In An Interpretation of Religion, Hick (following Kant) argues that there is the world in itself (noumenal), and the world as we understand and perceive it (phenomenal). Support for this view of things can be seen in the fact that people often see and perceive the same things differently. So we all cannot be seeing the world as it really is (otherwise, there would be no disagreement). Each person's experience of the way the world is is, therefore, an interpretation of experience specific to that individual's point-of-view.

Applying this insight to the matter of religious experience, Hick concludes that all religious experience is simply an expression of a particular experience of a transcendent reality by the devotee (what he also calls 'experiencing-as'). Thus we can see how someone born in India is not only going to naturally be a Hindu but also, consider the Hindu-worldview normative (or normal) and all others wrong. For they simply have no way of seeing things any differently!

The Real

In An Interpretation of Religion, Hick radically revised his earlier concept of God, replacing this notion with the idea of an ineffable Real. In theistic traditions (E.g. Judaism, Islam, and Christianity) God is encountered as a personal deity, but what of the non-personal encounters such as Brahman in the Hindu tradition? How can a personal God also be experienced as non-personal at the same time? The concept of an ineffable Real alleviates this dilemma. Turning once again to Kant, Hick distinguishes between the Real as it is in itself ('Real an sich') and the Real as it is variously experienced and thought of by the different faith traditions:

“I want to explore the pluralistic hypothesis that the great world faiths embody different perceptions and conceptions of, and correspondingly different responses to, the Real from within the major variant ways of being human; and that within each of them the transformation of human existence from self-centredness to Reality-centredness is taking place.” (John Hick)

The idea that we experience the Real in different ways, and that this is the reason why there are different faith traditions in the world, releases an inherent tension in pluralist theologies. Religious diversity does not try to avoid contradictions. Diversity and difference are the natural results of the varieties of human experience of the Real. People are different. We have been born in different places, into different families, and have been raised in different ways to each other. We should not be surprised that just as we have developed different sorts of music and art, so we are naturally going to develop different expressions of faith, belief and practice.

Now the fact that people are 'experiencing the Real' in different ways also begins to challenge the idea that only one faith-tradition is true (exclusivism). Also, in saying that the Real is ineffable and unable to be experienced, or understood, or expressed by human understanding/language, means Hick can also argue for the various faith-traditions as contexts for moral and spiritual betterment. Overall, the 'truthfulness' of a faith-tradition is not so much to do with whether its beliefs are true, but what sort of believer they are producing.

Re-interpreting salvation

In An Interpretation of Religion (and subsequent writings), Hick grounds his pluralist hypothesis in the idea of salvation as that which is a transformative thing:

“I suggest that these different conceptions of salvation are specifications of what, in a generic formula, is the transformation of human existence from self-centredness to a new orientation centred in the divine reality.” (John Hick)

For example, the Golden Rule can be found in all religions, which in the Christian tradition is expressed as “Treat others as you want them to treat you” (Matthew 7:12). Hick believes the extent to which faith-traditions promote this attitude in its adherents, is the extent to which we can consider it to be a valid (and true) expression of faith. Now this might immediately imply a sense of moral exclusivity, for if one faith tradition is producing more ‘saints’ (or good people) than others then surely we should be seeking to win people over to that faith in order to make the world a better place. However, when we compare each of the great world faiths to each other they all seem to be equally as effective in promoting this attitude in their devotees:

“We have no good reason to believe that any one of the great religious traditions has shown itself to be more productive of love/compassion than another.” (John Hick)

Although members of a faith may want to suggest that they are morally superior to others (and as such they would be suggesting that they are members of the 'true faith'), any claim to moral superiority cannot be validated by religious history. In each of the great world faiths, there have been both good and evil actions performed by its devotees. As Hick himself notes: “I suggest today that the onus of proof or of argument is upon any who claim that their own tradition produces morally and spiritually better human beings than all the others.”

Summary

Initially Hick presented his pluralistic hypothesis as something which held in tension the idea of a God of love and was based on a universal plan of salvation. However, over the course of his research, this shifted to focus more on the idea that each of the religions of the world is a unique and culturally conditioned human response to what he calls the Real. Furthermore, because Hick argues for the Real’s ineffability, the various religions of the world are not there to pass on 'truths' concerning it but to simply act as contexts in which human salvation (the shift from egocentrism to non-egocentrism) can take place. Although each religious tradition would distinguish itself from the others by seeing itself as superior to them (exclusivism), this claim cannot be validated when we observe that religious history reveals no distinguishable difference between each of them, so as to suppose the moral superiority or salvific effectiveness of one of them above the others.

An Introduction to John Hick's Pluralist Hypothesis (Part 1)

John Hick (d.2012) was an English philosopher of religion, who in his early years embraced a more evangelical (and fundamentalist) form of Christian belief; one that was firmly committed to the idea that Christianity was the true faith, and the Bible was God's sole revealed Word. However, due to numerous positive encounters with members of other faith traditions, he began to find great difficulty holding onto the belief that one religion was true, and that friends of his who were not-Christians would be going to hell for not subscribing to a belief in Jesus Christ. Furthermore, on the basis of his extensive reading of the scriptures of other faith traditions, he began to conclude that there was just as much 'good' in them as there was in the Bible.

Reviewing his subsequent shift in thinking in God Has Many Names (1980) he writes: “I have from almost as early as I can remember had a rather strong sense of the reality of God as the personal and loving lord of the universe”. The idea of God being both 'personal' and 'loving' were major influences in his development of a more open understanding of the relationship between faith traditions.

Problems with religious exclusivity

In his book God and the Universe of Faiths (1974), Hick began to lay the foundations of what would become his pluralist hypothesis. His initial interest was to explore what he felt was an inherent tension between the idea of a God of love and the Evangelical Christian attitude towards non-Christians. Within Evangelicalism, the possibility of salvation has traditionally been centred on the belief that the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ alone (the incarnate Son of God) has secured salvation for humanity, and that only a personal commitment and belief in this 'fact' would guarantee salvation. This has led to Christian exclusivism, expressed as 'outside Christianity there is no salvation' (aka 'outside the Church there can be no salvation').

However, Hick became concerned that if the Christian God is a God of love, and Christian salvation is the only true salvation, “Can we then accept the conclusion that the God of love who seeks to save all mankind has nevertheless ordained that men must be saved in such a way that only a small minority can, in fact, receive this salvation?”

Taking such a limited approach to the means by which people can be saved (i.e. literally by hearing about Jesus or becoming members of the Christian Church), means that for Hick most of the world would have to be considered damned: 

“It is the weight of this moral contradiction that has driven Christian thinkers in modern times to explore other ways of understanding the human religious situation.” (John Hick)

Accidents of birth 

As far as Hick is concerned a person's religious beliefs are largely determined by where they are born, and as such people cannot be held accountable for 'accidentally' not being born into a Christian environment. Thus, it makes no sense to say that a person born in India into a Hindu family, subsequently leading a good life based on Hindu beliefs, should be condemned by God simply because they were not born in a Christian country, or a Christian family, or because a Christian missionary had failed to reach them in time to tell them about Jesus before they died. In fact, it is obviously going to be the case that a person born in India will most likely grow up with the belief that salvation is achieved through (and by) the many Hindu gods, just as much someone born in Saudi Arabia is most likely going to become a Muslim and follow the teachings of Islam, and therefore will see no reason to convert to another faith tradition.

All this means Hick believes one's view of salvation (and the subsequent means of attaining it), is dependent on (and influenced by) where one has been born, and with this insight he felt he had dealt Christian exclusivism a mortal blow:

“Can we be so entirely confident that to have been born in our particular part of the world carries with it the privilege of knowing the full religious truth?” (John Hick)

Orthopraxis, not orthodoxy

From very early on in his work Hick rejected the Evangelical belief that one needed to hear and respond to a specific message in order to be 'saved'. He also sought to move away from notions of orthodoxy (correct belief) to orthopraxis (correct living); the latter being required if we want to begin to say, “All salvation… is the work of God”. As such, Hick began to interpret the world's religions as culturally-conditioned contexts within which people could grow as moral and spiritual beings, and thus challenged the idea that mission should be about attempting to convert rather than learning from people. Instead, Hick believes contact between members of other religions should only and always be positive and fruitful (“Not to displace but to deepen and enlarge their relationship with God”).

With these early insights, Hick laid the foundation for a revolution to take place in his theology of religion:

“Our next question is this: do we regard the Christian way as the only way, so that salvation is not to be found outside it; or do we regard the other great religions of mankind as other ways of life and salvation?”

An Introduction to John Hick's Pluralist Hypothesis (Part 2)

Notes

*Official website: www.johnhick.org.uk/jsite/

Don Cupitt and the New Christian Ethics (or the Non-God Moral Argument): Part 2

To read part 1 of this article click here

The new Christian ethic

In removing the old (objective/realist) view of God, Cupitt has cleared a path towards religious and moral freedom:

1. Morality can (and must) be creative: Defining what is moral (and what morality is), is our new task. We accept that we never had a morality given to us by God (despite what people might believe), nor will we ever have one given to us. Instead, it is up to us to discover what is right and wrong for ourselves, within the context of our different societies/communities. As we are not bound by any fixed or limited/limiting divine moral codes, we are essentially starting again; creating our values literally 'out-of-nothing' (ex nihilo).

2. Morality can (and must) inject value into life: Morality cannot be self-seeking. We are all unique creatures, and as such we should respect and value everyone equally. The old moral order was life and person denying. Now it can (and must) seek to embrace the fullness of the human experience, which includes everyone (and everything) living in the world.

3. Morality must be prophetic (not passive): Prophets speak out against the static, fixed and (wrongly) accepted norms of society. The new Christian ethic must speak out against the old prejudices (E.g. homophobia, patriarchy, lack of respect and care for the world). We must not accept moral codes simply because they are 'moral codes'. We must decide for ourselves what is right and wrong for us in each age. In doing so, we will make morality practical, rather than theoretical.

Re-grounding morality in religion

It is a mistake to accuse Cupitt of being anti-God, and anti-religion. Although he is clearly a revisionist when it comes to what has been traditionally believed about God (and morality), he still believes it is vital to retain religious symbolism when it comes to ethics, as this has been proven to be capable of developing good and moral people in the past:

“The human being acquires a dignity and status that is directly derived from the ancient holiness and worshipfulness of God. God indeed just was such a symbol of the goal towards which our moral development is heading and of the dignity to which we should ultimately attain.” (Don Cupitt)

Cupitt believes non-realist ethics should be religiously-based, because (at present) secular humanism has not got the proven and necessary symbols of value in it. For example, through Jesus Christ the Christian message is that God is fully human, and therefore knows and understands us intimately. For Cupitt, this is a powerful image and one which can give hope to those who are feeling hemmed in by an oppressive (realist) Christian morality. If God understands our humanity, then it follows that God will be more understanding (and less judgmental) of us.

Realist ethics was always about pursuing the Ideal; about learning who God is in order to understand what we should become like ('Be holy, because I am Holy' - 1 Peter 1:16). Such a morality was also largely built on contemplation and avoidance behaviour, as exemplified in the lives of monks and nuns. As a result of this the body became viewed as something which was easily swayed by sin. For example, people were encouraged to avoid relying on their feelings, as they could distract them from doing what God wants, or to avoid certain places and activities which were deemed sinful, potentially leading them into sin. All this is a rather negative view of things, and offered little incentive for considering oneself and others in a positive light.

The new world

“Our task, then, is to redeem people from the old masochistic 'orthodox' Christianity by curing them of the sense of sin, restoring their self-esteem and vindicating Christian action.” (Don Cupitt)

So what would a world built non-realist ethics (or new Christian ethics), look like? Firstly, life would be seen as an endless striving of activity, or endeavour. As there are no moral absolutes, so there is no expected outcome to life. We are not expected to become something, but simply to live our life. Secondly there is also no 'final success' or Ideal. This means there is no ultimate standard against which we can be judged or feel condemned by, because there is nothing to achieve or fall-short of. We simply 'fight until we drop'. Thirdly, no-one can claim perfection. We cannot look at others and judge their actions to be less-than perfect on the basis that we alone are living the moral life. No-one can make such a claim! Rather, we will simply acknowledge the choices some people have made and those others may not have made. Ultimately we should be aiming to remove the notions of 'sin' and guilt' from our thinking.

Finally, we are to be artists! Our life is to be one of moral creativity and imagination. We are to become absorbed into our work. We are no longer to have one eye on the 'clock' of life, against which we might feel the pressure to change things 'before it is too late'. We are simply to live our life to the full in each moment, and be content for it to end whenever that may be. We are to become like the sun, burning brightly, expending our energy ceaselessly until we are finally spent.

Some issues

In his book World Views and Perceiving God (1993), Joseph Runzo offers the following critiques of Don Cupitt's non-realist ethics:

Non-realist ethics encourages us to engage in self-deception

If you do not believe in the objective reality of God, why bother to continue with any form of religious belief, or revise the content of religious language to make it more palatable?

“Whilst acknowledging that God does not exist, we are to continue to use traditional language about God.” (Joseph Runzo)

Why be a Christian humanist? Why not simply be a secular humanist?

“Religion, [Cupitt] says, provides a supportive symbolic and institutional context for ethics… [however, this] appeal to a known fiction; [is] to encourage self-deception.' (Joseph Runzo [Brackets mine])

Non-realist ethics provide little check against moral anarchy and 'isolated idiosyncratic views’

If there are no moral absolutes, on what basis can others tell the Nazi or the Klansman that their moral take on things is wrong?

“If worldviews are incommensurate and there are no shared objective cross-schema moral standards, relying on 'one's own vocabulary' would count the Klansman right and allow for moral anarchy.” (Joseph Runzo)

God's existence does not imply 'blind obedience'

Runzo also argues that Cupitt is wrong to suggest that God's (objective) existence is morally oppressive. He argues that we often follow a person's advice because we trust them, and because we believe they are wise.

Non-realism fails to say why we should take the moral position

Cupitt claims it is rational to act morally. Runzo points out that it is also possible to be both rational and to act immorally! Cupitt's arguments appears to be unable to give any reason why someone should not be logically immoral, for if he did, he might be verging onto the territory of moral absolutes (which he resolutely denies the existence of).

Don Cupitt and the New Christian Ethics (or the Non-God Moral Argument): Part 1

Key terms

• Realism: The idea that there are absolute (transcendent) values of knowledge and truth. Most traditional Christian belief is grounded in a realist worldview. A realist view of ethics would say there are absolute standards of right and wrong, typically grounded in what God is said to have commanded people to do
• Non-realism: The belief that knowledge and truth is a simply a 'point-of-view'. A non-realist view of ethics would say there are no absolute standards of right and wrong, and that what is 'good' and 'bad' is largely determined and defined within the context of a particular social/religious community
• Ontology: To do with what something really is (the essence of a thing)
• Epistemology: To do with 'knowledge' and what we claim to know about something

Introduction

Don Cupitt* was ordained to the Diocese of Manchester in 1959, and until the early 1990s was a priest in the Church of England**. He became widely known for his radical theological position in the book Taking Leave of God (1980), and over the course of his career he has shifted from a realist to a non-realist position in terms of religious and moral truth. This shift in thinking has come about mainly due to his critique of the nature of religious knowledge, which has also influenced his understanding of the nature of moral truth-claims.

Many people mistakenly think that Christian non-realists do not believe in God, but this is not entirely true. Although non-realists do not believe in a God 'out there' or 'in the heavens' (i.e. beyond this world), they do believe in the concept of God and the important role this has played in cultures around the world. Non-realists believe the idea of God is essentially a human creation. They also see more opportunity for this view of God to be a positive influence in the world today.

A new starting-point for Christian ethics

Cupitt's point-of-departure in New Christian Ethics is grounded in what he considers to be the cultural condition of the time:

“The end of the old realistic conception of God as an all-powerful and objective spiritual Being independent of us and sovereign over us makes it now possible and even necessary for us to create a new Christian ethic it is we ourselves who alone make truth, make value, and so have formed the reality that now encompasses us.” (Don Cupitt)

Christian morality has traditionally been grounded in realism, supporting the notion that there are moral-truths and a moral order independent of this world. Morality is not a human creation. We have been given commands to follow. God is to be obeyed. There is to be no negotiation about how we should live. However, while this has been the dominant view of things over the years, as religious and moral truths have began to be challenged (and rejected) in the name of what it is reasonable (or rational) to believe in, this has led to a rejection of absolutes.

The major challenge to the certainty and centrality of religious belief in Europe came as a result of the work of philosophers in the the 1700s. This period in Western philosophical history is known as the Age of Reason (or The Enlightenment).

The pursuit of finding what it is reasonable (or rational) to believe, in terms of matters of faith, has resulted in a decline in belief of an objective (other-worldly) view of God. The main reason for this is because humans are now acknowledged to be active in the knowing-process. We do not just passively receive knowledge but have a role in shaping it. In terms of ethics this has challenged the idea that doing good is about passively obeying a so-called God-given moral code, and has led thinkers like Cupitt to conclude there are no absolute standards of right or wrong. The bottom line for all of this (as far as Cupitt is concerned), is that we need (and have) a new starting-point for Christian ethics:

“There is no bedrock and nothing is fixed, not my identity nor my sexuality nor my categories of thought, nothing... There is external measure or value or disvalue - and therefore our life is exactly as precious or as insignificant as we ourselves make it out to be.” (Don Cupitt)

The non-God moral argument

In New Christian Ethics Cupitt rejects the idea of a God who resides in the 'heavens'. If such a Being were to exist, it would by its very nature as a 'law-giver' impose a morality onto us either directly (by telling us what to do) or indirectly (by knowing what we should do). Either way, if God exists then humans are not truly free to find their own way in life, and have no choice but to live the specific way God deems right:

“How can such a heteronomous faith ever be the means whereby I become autonomous and fully-liberated spirit? It is impossible. This appears to be a conclusive religious argument against the objective existence of God. An objective God cannot save.” (Don Cupitt)

Cupitt's argument is that the traditional Christian view of God as a Divine-lawgiver residing in the heavens is repressive, especially as this God is often believed to have planned the right way we should live. Either directly or indirectly, humanity is expected (by God and through the church) to become the sort of persons God wants them to be. This is why Cupitt suggests this view of God cannot save anyone. Salvation implies freedom from..., however this view of God implies nothing more than submission:

“The more God is absolutised, the more we are presented with the possibility of living under the dominion of a cosmic tyrant who will allow nothing, and least of all religion, to change and develop.” (Don Cupitt)

Furthermore, as Cupitt believes we are limited in what we can know about God, because God is logically beyond our realm of experience, even if there were God-ordained objective moral standards they would be useless anyway, because we would not be able to attain full knowledge of them:

“Where previously the nature of God had dictated what could and could not be said of him, now the nature of language dictates what can and cannot meaningfully be said of anything, God included.” (Don Cupitt)

Don Cupitt and the New Christian Ethics (or the Non-God Moral Argument): Part 2

Notes

* Official website: www.doncupitt.com/don-cupitt

** Despite his radical departure from what the Anglican Church believes, he still remains a priest of 'good standing'.

The Divine Command Theory of Ethics (Part 2): Arguments against

To read part 1 of this article click here

The arbitrariness of God's commands

With the Divine Command Theory (DCT), whatever God says goes. Although most believers would probably not see any problem with this (especially if they take the view that God is benevolent), for others it suggests that morality is arbitrary, as God is not bound by some already established (or recognised) moral guidelines or moral authority, and if God is not bound by any moral law/criteria this means that the Ten Commandments (in the Judeo-Christian tradition) could have been, 'You shall kill people you do not like', or 'You shall steal' etc. That the commandment is "Do not kill"  or "Do not steal" is entirely due to God deciding that this is how it will be. As Theodore Schick Jr. notes:

"Since God is free to establish whatever set of moral principles [God] chooses, [God] could just have well have chosen this set as any other." (Schick Jr. T., Morality requires God.. or does it?" [Brackets mine])

For some people, such as the German philosopher G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716), this presents a worrying situation. Although he was a committed Christian, Leibniz argued that to believe God could have chosen to decree an alternative moral code to the one established, and still be considered morally justified in doing this, was to destroy whatever grounds one had for praising and worshipping God:

"Why praise him for what he has done, if he would be equally praiseworthy in doing the contrary? Where will be his justice and his wisdom if he has only a certain despotic power, if arbitrary will takes the place of reasonableness."  (G. W. Leibniz)

The point here is that if God's commands have no moral grounding apart from God’s will, then it is simply a matter of God choosing to say certain things are 'good' or not on the basis that they are right (or moral) to God. Now this requires an enormous amount of trust that the moral code God has decreed for humanity to live by is just and right. It also requires people to trust that this is the best of all possible worlds, in that the moral code God has established here cannot, will not, and should not be surpassed at any time. What this means is that if we think things could be better here, then we are essentially casting doubt on God's goodness.

On the problem of knowing if what God says is good, is Good (Kai Nielsen)

In his book Ethics Without God (1973), Kai Nielsen raises a number of objections to some of the central tenets of the DCT. Firstly, in order accept that God has given us a moral law to live by, we must surely have to assume that this moral law is accessible to us. For the Christian, God's moral law is said to be found in Scripture (the Bible), which as far as Nielsen is concerned requires them to first believe that the Bible is God's Word. However the problem with this is that before we can accept the idea that the Bible contains God's moral law, we have to first accept that it is the Word of God which contains God's moral law, which is clearly circular logic.

As an atheist Nielsen also under no compulsion to believe the Bible is the Word of God, and as such the idea that Scripture contains God's moral law is somewhat irrelevant as far as he is concerned. This also begs the question as to why he should feel obliged to live according to its precepts.

Even if the Bible does contain the commands of God, merely commanding someone to do something does not make it moral to that thing. For in order to accept that God's commands are 'good', we first have to assume that the terms 'God' and 'good' are identical. In other word's, the statement 'God is good' would have to be the equivalent of saying 'good is God'. Yet the problem with this is that in order to begin to understand the nature of moral goodness, we clearly need to know what goodness is, otherwise how do we know that God is actually good?

"We call God good because we have experienced the goodness of his acts, but in order to do this, in order to know that he is good or to have any grounds for believing that he is good, we must have an independent moral criterion which we use in making this predication of God." (Kai Nielsen)

Nielsen's point is that if God changed the moral code, how would we know whether this was a 'good' thing to do or not unless we have some prior knowledge of what constitutes Goodness. He also argues that it is logically impossible for God to create morality, as it is not a thing, but involves decisions about what what 'ought' to be the case. As such, the burden of proof is for the DCT to show why there can be no morality without God:

"Morality without religion, without theism, is quite possible. In fact, just the reverse is the case. Christianity, Judaism and theistic religions of that sort could not exist if people did not have a moral understanding that was, logically speaking, independent of them." (Kai Nielsen)

In closing Nielsen argues that if religion is the source of morality, then why are there so many atrocities committed in the name of God?

On the question of doing something just because God commands it (A. C. Grayling)

Philosopher A. C. Grayling discusses the DCT in his book, What Is Good?: The Search for the Best Way to Live. In chapter 4 (The Ordinances of God), he notes that a fundamental feature of morality in what he calls the 'religions of the book' (these being Judaism, Christianity and Islam), is that God commands something and people obey. Hand-in-hand with this is the notion that sin is disobedience (resulting in punishment), whilst virtue (or moral living) is obedience and will be rewarded (either in this life or the next). In the Bible, this idea is most famously illustrated in Genesis 3:1-24, where humanity is cursed and expelled from the Garden of Eden for eating the forbidden fruit. Commenting on the Genesis account, Grayling says:

"If a deity were passing this judgement now, it would be in violation of the article in most human rights conventions forbidding excessive, cruel and inhumane punishment."

Grayling's chief concern with the DCT is that it hinges around the dual notion of our being required to obey God's Laws because God commands us to do this, and fear of punishment if one does not. For Grayling this offers no justification for actually obeying the commands or God or even considering them to be Good. The only reason it seems we should obey them, is because we fear being punished.

Of course, the standard justification for the goodness of God's commands is (as we have seen), that they are grounded in the goodness (or benevolence) of God. However, the decision to accept that God is good would have to be based on some prior sense of what goodness is. Thus we arrive very firmly back at the Euthyphro Dilemma and the critiques of Kai Nielsen discussed here and in part 1. We also have to trust that God has in mind our long-term welfare and knows exactly what to do to bring this about. However, for Grayling, the evidence of history suggest God may not quite be able to do this:

"The 'Old Testament' is full of examples of a deity changing its mind, repenting of earlier decisions, committing genocide in some cases and mere mass murder in others, in fury as a result of mankind's exercise of the free will it gave them and which they have used in ways it seems not to have foreseen."

In this he appears to be echoing similar concerns about the nature of God as John Roth does (see A Theodicy of Protest: John K Roth).

In the end Grayling believes the basic premise of the DCT cannot be justified, because we should not be forced to accept the commands of God as being those we must obey, even if they are intended (by God) to make our lives better:

"My loving my children is not a reason for my children to live as I wish they would, still less as I order them to."

Thus Grayling concludes that it is an unsound argument to say that just because A loves B, that B must do as A requires. Of course, if A has perfect knowledge of what will be beneficial to B (and has the power to make this happen), then Grayling's argument may be significantly weakened.

The Divine Command Theory of Ethics (Part 1): Introduction and Arguments For

Introduction

“The religions of the book are distinctive, and perhaps unique, in postulating a personal deity who in each case makes a set of moral demands on its worshippers.” (A.C. Grayling, What is Good?)

The simple and basic premise of the divine command theory of ethics (DCT), is that something is good because God says it is. For example, from reading the Bible it seems we should not tell lies because this is one of the Ten Commandments given to Moses by God (Exodus 20:1-17). Following on from this we can say that any God-given moral truth (in any theistic faith) has the following features:

• God's commands must be treated as the Ultimate source of authority for what is considered 'right' and 'wrong', even if we do not agree with them or do not understand why this has to be the case
• The more knowledge we have of how God wants us to live (or the closer we get to God), the better our lives will be
• As God is unchanging, so moral truths will never change

Due to the relationship between God and 'goodness' (or the Good), we often hear some believers lamenting the downfall of society due to people turning away from God:

“When we as a country again acknowledge God as our creator and Jesus Christ as the Savior of mankind, we will be able to turn this nation around economically as well as in every other way.” (Rev, Jerry Falwell)

The DCT also assumes God is good (benevolent), and only wills good things (or issues good commands) for our benefit.

The Euthyphro Dilemma

Although the basic premise of the DCT is rather simple (what God commands is good, therefore do those things to live a good life), things get complicated once we start to consider why God's commands are to be deemed good.

The classic discussion of this philosophical question is attributed to the Ancient Greek philosopher Plato. In The Last Days of Socrates, Socrates is outside a courthouse awaiting prosecution by Meletus for corrupting the youth of Athens with his 'wisdom'. Unsurprisingly he gets into a conversation with someone, this time Euthyphro, who is there to prosecute his father for allowing a 'prisoner' to die. Euthyphro believes he is doing the right thing, or in other words, he considers his actions to be holy (or agreeable to the gods). So Socrates challenges him to state exactly what he thinks holiness (or 'Goodness') is. Euthyphro's initial answer is that, 'what is agreeable to the gods is holy, and what is not agreeable is unholy'. However, Socrates notes that sometimes the gods disagree amongst themselves, so this begs the question as to whether there can be any agreement between them as to what things are truly holy. In response, Euthyphro suggest that all of them would agree that killing a man is wrong (unholy).

Naturally Socrates wants him to prove this claim, and it is here that the Euthyphro dilemma is stated:

“Euthyphro: Well, I should certainly say that what's holy is whatever all the gods approve of, and that its opposite, what all the gods disprove of, is unholy…

Socrates: We'll soon be in better position to judge, my good chap. Consider the following point: is the holy approved by the gods because it's holy, or is it holy because it's approved?”

Socrates’ point is that what is ultimately holy must be something agreeable to all the gods at the same time, for it be the Ultimate standard of Holiness.

To help Euthyphro continue to work through this dilemma, Socrates offers him the suggestion that maybe what is Holy is what is Just? The problem here is that Euthyphro cannot explain the nature of Justice without circling back to his earlier argument; that what is Just is that which is divinely approved.

So we are faced with this circular logic:

• The gods are the source of moral authority (“the holy”)
• The gods approve of x because it is “holy”
• It is “holy” because the gods approve of it (or say it is “holy”)

The significance of the Euthyphro Dilemma for moral philosophy

Although those who believe in a God consider God to be the ground of morality, if there is no external verification for what God says is Good then God's commands appears arbitrary. Of course, for the believer this is no problem as they assume God is benevolent and would only command us to do good things. But what if God were not benevolent? What if God, having up till now condemned lying and murder, decided from now on that lying and murder were Good things to do? If we say God would never do this, because lying and murder are always wrong, this suggests there is a moral standard to which God and God's decrees conform. Thus the question begs; either God is the Ultimate source of Goodness (and we take our chances), or God’s commands conform to some other (Final) standard.

The Euthyphro Dilemma also highlights tensions for non-believers who speak about things being 'good'. Rather than any appealing to God an atheist may say we should appeal to some agreed notion of communal Goodness, but yet again we are faced with problem of justifying a communal sense of Goodness without appealing to some Final notion of 'Goodness'. How do we know that what the community says is good, is in fact Good? In the end we are left struggling to avoid an infinite regress in terms of justifying The Good.

The divine command theory - weak and strong versions

Although the basic premise of the DCT is that whatever God says is 'good' is Good, there are in fact two ways this can be analysed and understood:

• In weaker versions God's commands are said to be applicable only within the context of specific religious communities. For example, Fundamentalist Christians might say homosexuality is wrong, whereas more Liberal Christians may say it is not. Of course, this is not to say that Fundamentalist Christians believe Liberal Christians are correct in their belief (and vice-versa), but that when we analyse the nature of these two different beliefs about homosexuality, we can see that from the Fundamentalist point-of-view it is deemed wrong, but from the Liberal point-of-view it is not. Of course, one major problem with this view of things is that it offers no definitive position on moral issues. There is also no reason why either a Fundamentalist or Liberal Christian should take the view that their belief is wrong, or that they should change their opinion.

• In stronger versions doing 'good' is justified because God wills (or commands) it. This at least gives us a Final standard of Goodness to which we can appeal but as we have already seen there are several problems associated with this view of things. A further problem is that if what is 'good' is deemed to be so simply because God wills it, then this means only those who believe in God have to worry about moral accountability. Grounding morality in God may work for the believer, but has absolutely no relevance for those who do not believe God exists (despite the fact that many believers would say that atheists should obey God's commands). Grounding morality in God also leaves us struggling to the perfection this entails, leading to a lot of guilt and anguish amongst believers.

The Divine Command Theory of Ethics - Philip Quinn's Defence

Philip Quinn argued that The Divine Command Theory should not be rejected simply because God's commands might be said to be arbitrary (i.e. grounded in God' nature alone), but should be accepted because that seems to be the way God works:

• In the Old Testament there are times when God temporarily revoked established moral standards for special purposes. For example, although God had issued the command not to kill (Exodus 20:13), this was clearly revoked when the Israelites were required to enter the Promised Land. For once they were, 'in the cities of the nations the LORD your God is giving you as an inheritance, [they should] not leave alive anything that breathes' (Deuteronomy 20:16 [Bracket mine]).

• In the New Testament Jesus set new moral standards which surpassed those of the Old Testament, showing once again that it is possible to justify morality despite God 'moving the posts' a little ('You have heard that it was said to the people long ago, 'Do not murder, and anyone who murders will be subject to judgment.' But I tell you that anyone who is angry with his brother will be subject to judgment' - Matthew 5:21f).

• The very fact of God's sovereignty means that God is in control of everything, even moral standards. So who are we to argue?

So Quinn's point is that even though God's commands can be accused of being arbitrary (because they are grounded in the nature of God and can and do change), we should still accept them because ultimately God is Good. Of course, Quinn is assuming here that the God we know of (so far) from the Bible is not some evil despot, who might at some point in the future bring into existence a less-than benevolent moral code.

Also, Quinn's arguments only work for some people. For instance, to say that God's commands are 'good' even though God revoked an established moral standards such as “Do not kill” in order that Jews would cleanse the Holy Land, only works to prove to Jews that God is good but not to the numerous people slaughtered in God’s name. An appeal to one God as the source of moral Goodness is therefore questionable to those of different faiths, as well as atheists.

The divine command theory of ethics (Part 2): Arguments against