Situation Ethics (Part 6): The Third Proposition - Love and Justice are the same

The Third Proposition: Love and Justice are the same, for justice is love distributed, nothing else. (Joseph Fletcher)

Love is careful

One criticism of Fletcher’s Situation Ethics is that he never clearly defines love, but with the third proposition love becomes equated with Justice. Acting in love is not something done without any sense of responsibility towards others but is something which requires proper care and thought. In short, it is acting responsibly, and in this way Justice is love distributed.

Here is precisely the serious difficulty of love. How are its favors to be distributed among so many beneficiaries? We never have one neighbour at a time. (Joseph Fletcher)

We are reminded here of the Third Proposition, this being that situation ethics is positivistic; one is always making a choice to act in love towards others However, this needs to be understood in the context of the wider community. When choosing to act in love, everything and everyone must be taken into account. “No man is an island”, as the old saying goes!

As “persons” we are individuals in-community. Therefore love’s outreach is many-sided and wide-aimed, not one-directional; it is pluralist, not monist; multilateral, not unilateral. (Joseph Fletcher)

Wrongful Separation

We cannot separate love and Justice; neither one should be given priority over the other. For instance, we cannot decide to give away all our money to those in need, without also paying back those we owe money to (our creditors). To give away all our money to the poor may appear to be doing a loving thing, but if we don’t also repay what we owe, then it is actually an unjust (and, therefore, unloving) deed.

People also suffer and end up being treated badly when love and justice are separated. We cannot hold the law above persons, and neither can love be selective. All voices must be heard, and all demands considered equally. Love cannot be sentimental nor can it be concerned with just individual relationships. We should love all our neighbours (plural), not merely our neighbour.

It is often said that what is “due” to the neighbour is giving him his “rights”... [But] all alleged rights and duties are as contingent and relative as all values. The right to religious freedom, free speech, public assembly, private property, sexual liberty, life itself, the vote - all are validated only by love. (Joseph Fletcher)

Justice is nothing other than love working out its problems. (Joseph Fletcher)

Love Using its Head

Justice is love calculating and working out its duties and obligations. In terms of social policy, situation ethics appears to have much in common with UTILITARIANISM (but in this case it replaces ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’ principle with love (agape)). Situation ethics also agrees with DEONTOLOGICAL ETHICS, in that we should always seek to do the good (our duty), this being to, “seek the goal of the most love in every situation.”

Situation ethics is not individualistic, but makes decisions in the context of the wider community. In this way it follows Kant, by not treating others as a means to our own end:

Love does not permit us to solve our problems or sooth our wounds at the expense of innocent third parties. Our neighbours include all our neighbours. (Joseph Fletcher)

There also can be no impartial response to situations. We cannot simply throw our hands up and say, “It’s the law!”, for example. The decision to act in love is always a choice; a decision to do the most responsible thing.

Something to discuss: Talk about the actions of Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King Jr. in the context of situation ethics. Was Martin Luther King Jr. a Situationist?

Whenever or if ever any civil rights law ceases to serve love according to an enlightened grasp of love’s outreach, it should be thrown aside. (Joseph Fletcher)

Review

The Fourth Proposition - Love is not Liking

Situation Ethics (Part 5): The Third Proposition - Love is the Only Norm (continued)

Click here to read part 1 of this article

"In its very marrow Christian ethics is a situation ethic. The new morality, the emerging contemporary Christian conscience, separates Christian conduct from rigid creeds and rigid codes." (Joseph Fletcher)

Love Has No Equals

There is a natural fear in letting go of rules and laws. For one, legalism has been the dominant worldview in most societies, and so we have become accustomed to this way of thinking about morality. But there is another fear; that if we drop the legalist approach in Christianity, then people will no longer have any reason to be committed to the faith. If humans are able to do it for themselves, what need do they have of God?

Fletcher seems unconcerned by this. For him the central and only important matter at hand, is making ethical legalism subordinate to love. In his eyes, the “man of law” fears change simply because he has known nothing else, and that is all.*

A common criticism of Fletcher’s Situation Ethics is that he does not define clearly what he means by love. In discussing the second proposition, Fletcher comes closest to defining it as agape (non-reciprocal, neighbour-regarding) love, as opposed to philia (friendship) or eros (romantic).

"Erotic and philic love are emotional, but the effective principle of Christian love is will, disposition; it is an attitude, not feeling." (Joseph Fletcher)

"What a difference it makes when love, understood agapeically, is boss; when love is the only norm. How free and therefore responsible we are!" (Joseph Fletcher)

Objections

In the final section of this chapter, Fletcher addresses some objections to his Situation Ethics:

1. Humanity after the Fall

There are Christians who believe in a literal Fall of humanity from an original state of perfection as outlined in the first chapters of Genesis in the Bible. They believe that as a result of humans choosing to disobey God, that our moral compass has become corrupted and incapable of making choices that align with the Will of God. For them, this explains why we need God to give us laws and Commandments to live by.

Fletcher’s approach is to emphasize another aspect of Christian belief, this being the positive effect of Christ dying for our sins:

“It is for freedom that Christ has set us free. Stand firm, then, and do not let yourselves be burdened again by a yoke of slavery.“ (Galatians 5:1)

Following the Apostle Paul Fletcher shifts the focus from Law to that of Grace (this being the good things that occur in one’s life as a result of being saved by Christ).

Something to think about: Do you see any problems for Fletcher’s Situation Ethics in terms of non-Christian faiths, atheists etc.?

“The Christian is called to be mature, to live by grace and freedom, to respond to life, to be responsible." (Joseph Fletcher)

2. The centrality of freedom

In light of the Fall, some Christians believe we cannot now be trusted to make free choices. According to them were are innately disposed to act selfishly and contrary to God’s Will. In fact, they would say it was our freedom which led to us to disobey God in the Garden of Eden (see Genesis 3:1-24).

For the ethical legalistic the Law is all about directing and controlling people, and as such this sets limits on what we can and should do. The legalist also believes this is for our own good. For Fletcher the law inhibits our personal obligation and responsibility. Situation Ethics on the other hand maximizes personal obligation and responsibility.

Something to think about: Which do you prefer, clearly set out guidelines for how to behave, or the ability to choose to act as you see fit? Why do you prefer this?

Law may be indeed a necessary feature of community and can even be constructive. But when the motive of the law observer is to hide behind the letter of the law in order to escape the higher demands of its spirit or to escape the complexities of responsible decision, that is cheap legalism. (Joseph Fletcher)

"Decision is "a risk rooted in the courage of being" free." (Joseph Fletcher)

3. Predicting the future

A criticism Fletcher notes as being somewhat valid, is that situation ethics requires a greater degree of knowledge about a situation than legalism does. One appears to need to already know that following the Law on a particular matter will not reap the best consequences. But do we have access to such knowledge, or can we? We are in a sense making decisions based simply on assumption. In response, Fletcher counters that we are well within our remit to call upon experts to guide us, and even the Law may be a useful tool in this respect. But of course, if anything undermines our personal freedom to act in a loving manner, then it needs to be set aside for the sake of love.

In the end Fletcher directs the readers to reflect on the example of Jesus, who he says was willing to set aside the Law for the sake of the "radical decisions of love".

"If law cuts down our range of free initiative and personal responsibility, by doing our thinking for us, we are so much the less for it as persons. Situation ethics aims to widen freedom, which is the other face of responsibility." (Joseph Fletcher)

Review

The Third Proposition - Love and Justice are the same

Notes

*Keep in mind that Fletcher rejects ethical legalism because (for him) it simply does not work. Despite having established universal principles for people to live by, legalists often compromise what their law demands of them (E.g. Telling “white lies”, when lying is supposed to be wrong). Fletcher's point is that a claim to possess indubitable moral precepts requires one to live in full obedience to them, not water them down or compromise them.

Situation Ethics (Part 5): The Second Proposition - Love is the Only Norm (Part 1)

The Second Proposition: “The ruling norm of Christian decision is love: nothing else." (Joseph Fletcher)

Love Replaces Law

Jesus was once asked which of the commandments was the most important. His response surprised the people gathered around him:

“‘Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind.’ This is the first and greatest commandment. And the second is like it: ‘Love your neighbour as yourself.’ All the Law and the Prophets hang on these two commandments.” (Matthew 22:37-40)

There are 613 commandments in the Torah (aka Pentateuch = First five books of the Old Testament in the Bible). The most well-known set of commandments in the Torah are the Decalogue; more commonly known as “The Ten Commandments” (Exodus 20:1- 17). As a Christian Situationist, Fletcher has to address the matter of these extensive religious and moral laws. Taken literally the question begs: Do we serve the interests of love by living according each of these commandments, or do we serve the interests of love when we put them to one side? Fletcher’s argument favours the latter response because there were times when both Jesus and the Apostle Paul were prepared to put aside the law, in order to serve the greater interests of love (see Mark 2:27-28 and 1 Corinthians 10: 23-26).

Tablets of Stone

"There can be, and often is, a conflict between love and law." (Joseph Fletcher)

If love is not served by a literal following of the Ten Commandments, then how is the Situationist to respond to their demands? Fletcher offers the following ‘revisions’:

1. “You shall have no other gods before me” - More of a tautology than a command. If you worship Yahweh then you will (naturally) not have faith in any other gods. A fact of faith, rather than a prohibition.
2. You shall not make for yourself an image…” - Is this to be taken literally? What about the icons used in Catholic and Eastern Christianity and the many varieties of religious art which have inspired, enhanced worship and drawn devotees closer to the Divine? Are these ALL wrong?
3. “You shall not misuse the name of the Lord” - Are we to take no oaths? What about when priests and married couples make promises in God’s name? Maybe this command is more to do with prohibiting the use of God’s name for magical purposes or for false oaths (unless love’s interests are better served by doing so).
4. “Remember the Sabbath” - Is the “Sabbath” here referring to Saturday (Judaism) or Sunday (Christianity)? Is it even possible for this law to be kept? Are nurses, surgeons, doctors, and even the police to stop working too?

"The last six of the commandments… are more “ethical” in the ordinary non-theological sense of the word [and all] but the fifth (Honour your father and mother) are universal negatives. But situation ethics has good reason to hold it as a duty in some situations to break them, any or all of them." (Joseph Fletcher [brackets mine])

Even the prohibition “Do not kill” is regularly compromised by Christians when they eat meat, argue in favour of self-defence, support Just War, advocate capital punishment and support mercy-killings (Euthanasia). We should note that even after this prohibition was given Jews continued to offer blood sacrifices in the Temple, and even Christians argue that the death of Christ was something demanded by God as a means to forgive sin (“God presented Christ as a sacrifice of atonement, through the shedding of his blood” - Romans 3:25). If we are commanded not to kill, how do we explain these things?

So it seems that due to the problems and inconsistencies in trying to literally keep the all of the commandments, Fletcher advocates we accept only one Law, this being the law of love:

"There is nothing outside a situation which by going into it can prejudge it." (Joseph Fletcher)

Neither Nature Nor Scripture

"Legalism is legalism whether it rests upon nature or upon Scripture. Both kinds are quicksand." (Joseph Fletcher)

Christian ethics has historically been grounded in either Scripture or natural law. In terms of the latter, the idea here is that through a careful study of nature we can deduce a Divinely established order of things, and from this understand how we should act.*

Fletcher argues that whilst we may deduce a natural order of things from nature, this is not to say we can know how to act on the basis of this**. To suggest otherwise is to commit the Naturalist Fallacy (Is-Ought). If anything nature reveals quite opposite from that of moral certainties, for when we consider the history of humanity throughout the ages we see that there have been no universal laws held by all persons, all the time. Instead we find certain platitudes have been held, such as “Do good to all”, but no specific agreement on what “The Good” is, or how we should specifically act. Even Scripture invites a variety of responses and interpretations to the different commandments in it, and as such this undermines the notion that we should take them literally and treat them as universals to live by.

The Second Proposition - Love is the Only Norm (Continued)

Review

Notes

*The classic example of Christian ethics and natural law is the Catholic teaching on contraception and abortion. Without the use of any contraception, sexual intercourse can lead to pregnancy. Thus, the argument goes, God’s natural order of things is that sexual intercourse is primarily intended for procreation, and as such anything which hinders this (or prevents it from ending in the birth of a baby) is contrary to the Will of God and morally wrong.

**Fletcher cites the example of a Federal Judge in the US, who used natural law to argue in favour of racial segregation on a golf course. He suggested that segregation was justified, because in nature we observe that no birds of a different kind will rest together on the same branch of a tree.

Virtue Ethics: A Very Brief Introduction

Introduction

Virtue ethics has become increasingly popular in recent years, largely as a result of the 1958 essay Modern Moral Philosophy by Elizabeth Anscombe, and more recently the 1981 book After Virtue by Alasdair MacIntyre. However, variations on the 'virtues' theme have also been explored in the work of Plato (427-347 BCE), through the relationship between knowledge and the Form of the Good, and also Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 CE), with his concept of primary moral qualities. In terms of the history of western moral philosophy, the origins of virtue ethics are often traced back to Aristotle (384-322 BCE), and his concept of eudaimonia.

The word eudaimonia is sometimes mistakenly understood to mean simply "happiness", but it is, in fact, more to do with the idea of being content with life (leading one to become successful and happy). Aristotle believed eudaimonia could also be a means for working out what to do (or not). For instance, 'virtues' such as always telling the truth (or never lying) can be considered to be 'good' or not insofar as they lead one towards eudaimonia.

What virtue ethics is

Virtue ethics is often focused on how adopting certain attitudes and behaviour may lead to the fulfillment of x, rather than attempting to reason what it is ‘good’ to do (or not) using abstract rational arguments and principles. In this respect, one might consider the various forms of it to be teleological* and pragmatic.

Virtue Ethics is also more concerned with understanding what makes a person 'good', rather than whether specific actions are good or not (although the two are clearly linked). For instance, rather than saying we should never lie, we should instead consider whether people can attain eudaimonia if they live in a world where lying is treated as a virtue.

Right attitude; right actions

Students of moral philosophy might see some similarities between virtue ethics and Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative. Although Kant believed people should only act out of a sense of (reasoned) dispassionate 'duty', so that they do not confuse what is 'right' with what they want to do or what will simply make them happy, a vital part of this process is the need to set one's actions into a wider moral context (the 'universalisation principle' - 'Act as if the maxim of your action was  become through your will a universal law of nature'). Although he never discusses it, Kant seems unable to avoid the suggestion that having the 'right' sort of character (or virtues) is vital, if someone is to be seen to act 'rightly' (or do 'good').

To illustrate this, consider the possibility that behaviour often considered to be non-virtuous is sometimes something we should do. For example, if person y wanted to kill person x, and we knew where person x was, we might lie to person y in order to prevent person x being killed. Legalistic approaches to this matter (such as Kant's), try to, but cannot comfortably accommodate these 'exceptions to the rule'. On the other hand, virtue ethics suggests that it is not so much about working out if lying is a 'good' or 'bad' thing to do in these situations, but that the virtuous person would know what to do when faced with such a situation. This is because in this situation and as a 'virtuous' person, they have the innate ability to perceive the 'middle (right) way' between the extremes of never lying, and always telling the truth. Therefore, it is not so much that we trust that their actions are 'good', but that we trust them because they are a 'good' person.

Some issues

In the end a significant part of working out how we should live depends on understanding what constitutes the purpose of human life, and in light of this developing the ‘right’ kind of character (or attitude/virtues) in order to achieve it. This is something virtue theorists have been particularly critical of other 'ethical schools' for neglecting, as well as ignoring the influence a person's character has on their moral outlook and actions. However, a major challenge for virtue theorists is to set out exactly what the core virtues are (if indeed there are any), and what the purpose (or goal) of life is (towards which the virtues are directed). This is clearly not an easy thing to do, as people inevitably differ as to what they think the purpose of life is, and what the key virtues (or attitudes/qualities) 'good' people have.

Notes

* In Greek the word telos means end/purpose. 'Teleological' approaches in ethics judge the rightness of moral actions based on how much they lead one to achieve a particular end or fulfill a purpose.

Don Cupitt and the New Christian Ethics (or the Non-God Moral Argument): Part 2

To read part 1 of this article click here

The new Christian ethic

In removing the old (objective/realist) view of God, Cupitt has cleared a path towards religious and moral freedom:

1. Morality can (and must) be creative: Defining what is moral (and what morality is), is our new task. We accept that we never had a morality given to us by God (despite what people might believe), nor will we ever have one given to us. Instead, it is up to us to discover what is right and wrong for ourselves, within the context of our different societies/communities. As we are not bound by any fixed or limited/limiting divine moral codes, we are essentially starting again; creating our values literally 'out-of-nothing' (ex nihilo).

2. Morality can (and must) inject value into life: Morality cannot be self-seeking. We are all unique creatures, and as such we should respect and value everyone equally. The old moral order was life and person denying. Now it can (and must) seek to embrace the fullness of the human experience, which includes everyone (and everything) living in the world.

3. Morality must be prophetic (not passive): Prophets speak out against the static, fixed and (wrongly) accepted norms of society. The new Christian ethic must speak out against the old prejudices (E.g. homophobia, patriarchy, lack of respect and care for the world). We must not accept moral codes simply because they are 'moral codes'. We must decide for ourselves what is right and wrong for us in each age. In doing so, we will make morality practical, rather than theoretical.

Re-grounding morality in religion

It is a mistake to accuse Cupitt of being anti-God, and anti-religion. Although he is clearly a revisionist when it comes to what has been traditionally believed about God (and morality), he still believes it is vital to retain religious symbolism when it comes to ethics, as this has been proven to be capable of developing good and moral people in the past:

“The human being acquires a dignity and status that is directly derived from the ancient holiness and worshipfulness of God. God indeed just was such a symbol of the goal towards which our moral development is heading and of the dignity to which we should ultimately attain.” (Don Cupitt)

Cupitt believes non-realist ethics should be religiously-based, because (at present) secular humanism has not got the proven and necessary symbols of value in it. For example, through Jesus Christ the Christian message is that God is fully human, and therefore knows and understands us intimately. For Cupitt, this is a powerful image and one which can give hope to those who are feeling hemmed in by an oppressive (realist) Christian morality. If God understands our humanity, then it follows that God will be more understanding (and less judgmental) of us.

Realist ethics was always about pursuing the Ideal; about learning who God is in order to understand what we should become like ('Be holy, because I am Holy' - 1 Peter 1:16). Such a morality was also largely built on contemplation and avoidance behaviour, as exemplified in the lives of monks and nuns. As a result of this the body became viewed as something which was easily swayed by sin. For example, people were encouraged to avoid relying on their feelings, as they could distract them from doing what God wants, or to avoid certain places and activities which were deemed sinful, potentially leading them into sin. All this is a rather negative view of things, and offered little incentive for considering oneself and others in a positive light.

The new world

“Our task, then, is to redeem people from the old masochistic 'orthodox' Christianity by curing them of the sense of sin, restoring their self-esteem and vindicating Christian action.” (Don Cupitt)

So what would a world built non-realist ethics (or new Christian ethics), look like? Firstly, life would be seen as an endless striving of activity, or endeavour. As there are no moral absolutes, so there is no expected outcome to life. We are not expected to become something, but simply to live our life. Secondly there is also no 'final success' or Ideal. This means there is no ultimate standard against which we can be judged or feel condemned by, because there is nothing to achieve or fall-short of. We simply 'fight until we drop'. Thirdly, no-one can claim perfection. We cannot look at others and judge their actions to be less-than perfect on the basis that we alone are living the moral life. No-one can make such a claim! Rather, we will simply acknowledge the choices some people have made and those others may not have made. Ultimately we should be aiming to remove the notions of 'sin' and guilt' from our thinking.

Finally, we are to be artists! Our life is to be one of moral creativity and imagination. We are to become absorbed into our work. We are no longer to have one eye on the 'clock' of life, against which we might feel the pressure to change things 'before it is too late'. We are simply to live our life to the full in each moment, and be content for it to end whenever that may be. We are to become like the sun, burning brightly, expending our energy ceaselessly until we are finally spent.

Some issues

In his book World Views and Perceiving God (1993), Joseph Runzo offers the following critiques of Don Cupitt's non-realist ethics:

Non-realist ethics encourages us to engage in self-deception

If you do not believe in the objective reality of God, why bother to continue with any form of religious belief, or revise the content of religious language to make it more palatable?

“Whilst acknowledging that God does not exist, we are to continue to use traditional language about God.” (Joseph Runzo)

Why be a Christian humanist? Why not simply be a secular humanist?

“Religion, [Cupitt] says, provides a supportive symbolic and institutional context for ethics… [however, this] appeal to a known fiction; [is] to encourage self-deception.' (Joseph Runzo [Brackets mine])

Non-realist ethics provide little check against moral anarchy and 'isolated idiosyncratic views’

If there are no moral absolutes, on what basis can others tell the Nazi or the Klansman that their moral take on things is wrong?

“If worldviews are incommensurate and there are no shared objective cross-schema moral standards, relying on 'one's own vocabulary' would count the Klansman right and allow for moral anarchy.” (Joseph Runzo)

God's existence does not imply 'blind obedience'

Runzo also argues that Cupitt is wrong to suggest that God's (objective) existence is morally oppressive. He argues that we often follow a person's advice because we trust them, and because we believe they are wise.

Non-realism fails to say why we should take the moral position

Cupitt claims it is rational to act morally. Runzo points out that it is also possible to be both rational and to act immorally! Cupitt's arguments appears to be unable to give any reason why someone should not be logically immoral, for if he did, he might be verging onto the territory of moral absolutes (which he resolutely denies the existence of).

Don Cupitt and the New Christian Ethics (or the Non-God Moral Argument): Part 1

Key terms

• Realism: The idea that there are absolute (transcendent) values of knowledge and truth. Most traditional Christian belief is grounded in a realist worldview. A realist view of ethics would say there are absolute standards of right and wrong, typically grounded in what God is said to have commanded people to do
• Non-realism: The belief that knowledge and truth is a simply a 'point-of-view'. A non-realist view of ethics would say there are no absolute standards of right and wrong, and that what is 'good' and 'bad' is largely determined and defined within the context of a particular social/religious community
• Ontology: To do with what something really is (the essence of a thing)
• Epistemology: To do with 'knowledge' and what we claim to know about something

Introduction

Don Cupitt* was ordained to the Diocese of Manchester in 1959, and until the early 1990s was a priest in the Church of England**. He became widely known for his radical theological position in the book Taking Leave of God (1980), and over the course of his career he has shifted from a realist to a non-realist position in terms of religious and moral truth. This shift in thinking has come about mainly due to his critique of the nature of religious knowledge, which has also influenced his understanding of the nature of moral truth-claims.

Many people mistakenly think that Christian non-realists do not believe in God, but this is not entirely true. Although non-realists do not believe in a God 'out there' or 'in the heavens' (i.e. beyond this world), they do believe in the concept of God and the important role this has played in cultures around the world. Non-realists believe the idea of God is essentially a human creation. They also see more opportunity for this view of God to be a positive influence in the world today.

A new starting-point for Christian ethics

Cupitt's point-of-departure in New Christian Ethics is grounded in what he considers to be the cultural condition of the time:

“The end of the old realistic conception of God as an all-powerful and objective spiritual Being independent of us and sovereign over us makes it now possible and even necessary for us to create a new Christian ethic it is we ourselves who alone make truth, make value, and so have formed the reality that now encompasses us.” (Don Cupitt)

Christian morality has traditionally been grounded in realism, supporting the notion that there are moral-truths and a moral order independent of this world. Morality is not a human creation. We have been given commands to follow. God is to be obeyed. There is to be no negotiation about how we should live. However, while this has been the dominant view of things over the years, as religious and moral truths have began to be challenged (and rejected) in the name of what it is reasonable (or rational) to believe in, this has led to a rejection of absolutes.

The major challenge to the certainty and centrality of religious belief in Europe came as a result of the work of philosophers in the the 1700s. This period in Western philosophical history is known as the Age of Reason (or The Enlightenment).

The pursuit of finding what it is reasonable (or rational) to believe, in terms of matters of faith, has resulted in a decline in belief of an objective (other-worldly) view of God. The main reason for this is because humans are now acknowledged to be active in the knowing-process. We do not just passively receive knowledge but have a role in shaping it. In terms of ethics this has challenged the idea that doing good is about passively obeying a so-called God-given moral code, and has led thinkers like Cupitt to conclude there are no absolute standards of right or wrong. The bottom line for all of this (as far as Cupitt is concerned), is that we need (and have) a new starting-point for Christian ethics:

“There is no bedrock and nothing is fixed, not my identity nor my sexuality nor my categories of thought, nothing... There is external measure or value or disvalue - and therefore our life is exactly as precious or as insignificant as we ourselves make it out to be.” (Don Cupitt)

The non-God moral argument

In New Christian Ethics Cupitt rejects the idea of a God who resides in the 'heavens'. If such a Being were to exist, it would by its very nature as a 'law-giver' impose a morality onto us either directly (by telling us what to do) or indirectly (by knowing what we should do). Either way, if God exists then humans are not truly free to find their own way in life, and have no choice but to live the specific way God deems right:

“How can such a heteronomous faith ever be the means whereby I become autonomous and fully-liberated spirit? It is impossible. This appears to be a conclusive religious argument against the objective existence of God. An objective God cannot save.” (Don Cupitt)

Cupitt's argument is that the traditional Christian view of God as a Divine-lawgiver residing in the heavens is repressive, especially as this God is often believed to have planned the right way we should live. Either directly or indirectly, humanity is expected (by God and through the church) to become the sort of persons God wants them to be. This is why Cupitt suggests this view of God cannot save anyone. Salvation implies freedom from..., however this view of God implies nothing more than submission:

“The more God is absolutised, the more we are presented with the possibility of living under the dominion of a cosmic tyrant who will allow nothing, and least of all religion, to change and develop.” (Don Cupitt)

Furthermore, as Cupitt believes we are limited in what we can know about God, because God is logically beyond our realm of experience, even if there were God-ordained objective moral standards they would be useless anyway, because we would not be able to attain full knowledge of them:

“Where previously the nature of God had dictated what could and could not be said of him, now the nature of language dictates what can and cannot meaningfully be said of anything, God included.” (Don Cupitt)

Don Cupitt and the New Christian Ethics (or the Non-God Moral Argument): Part 2

Notes

* Official website: www.doncupitt.com/don-cupitt

** Despite his radical departure from what the Anglican Church believes, he still remains a priest of 'good standing'.